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Tudor and Tudor: Stem Cell Patentability in the EU

STEM CELL AND BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PATENTABILITY AND
RESEARCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
Jacqueline Hill Tudor* and Jarrod Tudor†

ABSTRACT
Stem cell and biotechnological research is a flourishing industry
around the globe. The growth of the industry can be attributed to its
promise to lead to a cure for numerous human diseases that are currently
considered unconquered. Within this industry, the patentability of
researched innovations has been a hot topic in the past decade. Through
the patenting process, the industry itself can be a source of economic
opportunity for countries willing to extend patent protection for the
inventions produced by stem cell and biotechnological research.
Because it takes significant resources for research to produce a
patentable invention, investors desire assurances that their time and
money will head a result from which they can benefit, whether that be a
financial benefit, a status benefit, or some other benefit. Despite the
medical promises of stem cell and biotechnological research, there are
concerns in some places around the world such as the European Union
about potential policy implications that would stem from patenting
innovations in this industry. These concerns are displayed in the two
leading sources of law governing stem cell and biotechnological
research: the European Union’s Directive 98/44/EC and the European
Patent Convention.
This Article discusses the patentability of stem cell and
biotechnological inventions under both European Union law and the
European Patent Convention. The Article continues by discussing several
other topics that a practitioner must be familiar with when analyzing a
patentability issue. A few of these topics include the morality debate, the
promise of stem cell and biotechnological research, taxation of stem cellrelated products, access to records, legal notice, research funding, and
the free movement of goods. This Article also examines the key case law
from both the European Court of Justice as well as the two judicial organs
of the European Patent Office, the Board of Appeal and the Enlarged
Board of Appeal, that provide insight into this area of law. Additionally,
this Article identifies the discrepancies between the law governing stem
cell research and biotechnological research within the European
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continent and provides recommendations for greater harmonization
within these two areas of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
A. The stem cell research industry.
With robust investment at play, the stem cell and biotechnology
industry is a thriving global phenomenon.1 For those participating in this
industry, it can be an incredibly lucrative opportunity.2 In addition to basic
research, the industry includes advanced segments such as services for
storing body tissues, organs, and cells.3 In recent years, human cells have
become global commodities and the industry has grown exponentially.
However, increased regulation in certain areas of the globe has created a
shortage of supply which in turn has created a lucrative market for these
cells; a market that is largely composed of wealthy individuals and
satisfied using cells from countries with less regulation. Within this
market, certain types of cells and human tissue are more easily
transferred. For example, unfertilized ova are more easily traded across
countries while oocytes are scarcely traded.4 There is evidence that a gap
in the human tissue economy exists and that experimental therapies
involving stem cell technology could lead to a solution to filling this gap.5
Stem cell research is a segment of biotechnological research that
promises to lead to cures for some of the world’s most damaging and most
expensive human diseases, such as cancer and cardiovascular diseases,
that are currently considered either incurable or untreatable.6 The market
for stem cell technologies is expected to grow quickly over the next
several years with one estimate forecasting $7.3 billion in additional
investment.7 This industry has provided large economic opportunities for
players choosing to participate. Being that the European Union offers
protection of inventions through the European intellectual property laws,
the stem cell industry has experienced a large in the number of
participating players within Europe.8 As more and more patents are issued
for stem cell research based inventions, investment in the industry will
become more enticing because of the potential revenue streams for the

1. SARAH DEVANY, STEM CELL RESEARCH AND THE COLLABORATIVE REGULATION OF
INNOVATION 55 (2014); see also id. at 87.
2. Id. at 22.
3. Maria Fannin, Personal Stem Cell Banking and the Problem with Property, 12 SOCIAL &
CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY 342-343 (2011).
4. GOTTWEIS, ET. AL, supra note 5, at 46.
5. Id. at 4.
6. GOTTWEIS, ET. AL, supra note 5, at 7. See also Eneda Hoxha, Stemming the Tide: Stem Cell
Innovation in the Myriad-Mayo-Roslin Era, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. t 567-568 (2015).
7. ANDREAS HUBEL, ULRICH STORZ, & ALOYS HUTTERMAN, LIMITS OF PATENTABILITY: PLANT
SCIENCES, STEM CELLS AND NUCLEIC ACIDS 9 (2013).
8. JUSTINE PILA & PAUL TORREMANS, EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 3 (2016).
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investors.9
According to Margarit, Levy, and Loike, stem cell technologies are
believed to be in an infancy stage. 10 Many factors contribute to the
obstacles in the way of the growth of stem cell research. First, stem cell
research firms and other players in the industry will always be competing
for capital with one another because of the limited number of potential
investors.11 Furthermore, stem cell research is subject to heavy regulation,
both in regard to the use of stem cells in research as well as the patents
derived from said research.12 The patenting process of stem cell research
discoveries is one of the most controversial topics in intellectual property
law.13 The controversy stems from the diverse view as to what constitutes
a human embryo.14
Much of the current investment in stem cell research is comprised of
public funds with the investing country trying to increase its strength in a
knowledge-based economy.15 In 2005, South Korea created the World
Stem Cell Hub so that it could advance its position in the knowledgebased economy.16 On the other side of the world, the U.S. has successfully
used its intellectual property law to aggressively progress the
biotechnology industry.17
While many countries around the globe have heavily invested in stem
cell research, there are risks involved in this form of research. For
example, biomedical research can be more costly in comparison to other
scientific fields due to the need for specialized laboratories and
scientists.18 Further, biomedical research is also riskier in comparison to
other scientific fields because firms and inventors must spend significant
resources on trials to protect public health and safety. 19 Despite these
realities, countries are pushing money into the field with the hopes of
finding cures for previously untreatable human diseases.

9. Hoxha, supra note 10, at 569.
10. Yehezkel Margarit, Orrie Levy, & John Loike, The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive
Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 138 (2014).
11. GOTTWEIS, supra note 5, at 19.
12. HUBEL, supra note 9.
13. PILA, supra note 16, at 101.
14. AURORA PLOMER & PAUL TORREMANS, EMBRYONIC STEM CELL PATENTS: EUROPEAN LAW
AND ETHICS 30 (2009).
15. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 22.
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 179.
18. RAVEESHA GUPTA, HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS PATENTING: INNOVATION VS
MORALITY 16 (2016).
19. Id. at 16.
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B. International variations.
There is much debate as to the legal status of the components within
the human body, including tissues, organs, and cells.20 There is also
debate as to what constitutes something such as a human embryo.21 This
debate regarding stem cell research is global in scope with various sides
including industry players, state interests, consumer advocates, and
ethical opponents competing for dominance.22 The international
framework for stem cell research contains much diversity in regard to
what is considered permissible research activity.23 The International Stem
Cell Initiative is a global organization charged with standardizing and
harmonizing the area of stem cell research across the globe.24 Countries
have responded to the Initiative’s efforts at international harmonization in
various ways. Responses range from complete prohibitions against all
research on embryos all the way to explicit endorsement and public
funding of such research.25
Comparing Japanese law and European law provides a glance at the
varying sides of the aforementioned spectrum. The Japanese law has a
strong concern for the morality of what can potentially be patented; as a
result, it elects to place limitations on the research it endorses. On the
other hand, the European law endorses more methods of stem cell
research.26
Canada allows for stem cell research to be conducted so long as certain
requirements are met by the researcher including that the research has
potential health benefits, there is a system of free and informed consent
based on full disclosure for donation purposes, respect exists for privacy
and confidentiality, payment is not made for donation, embryos are not
created merely for science, and there is respect for human dignity as well
as physical, spiritual, and cultural dignity. 27 Despite these restrictions,
some major breakthroughs in the field of stem cell research have come
out of Canada.28
In China, stem cell research can be performed on spare embryos
20. Fannin, supra note 4, at 340
21. Francoise Baylis & Timothy Krahn, The Trouble with Embryos, 22 SOCIAL STUDIES 32 (2009).
22. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 4.
23. Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Michael Falk, Elizabeth Donley, David Kettner, & Lissa Koop, Legal
Framework Pertaining to Research Creating or Using Human Embryonic Stem Cells, in HUMAN
EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 328 (J. Ororico, S.-C. Zhang, & R. Pedersen eds. 2005).
24. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 22.
25. Appendix E: Overview of International Human Embryonic Stem Cell Laws, 34 THE NEW
ATLANTIS 129 (2012).
26. Plomer at 5.
27. Appendix E: Overview of International Human Embryonic Stem Cell Laws, 34 THE NEW
ATLANTIS 130 (2012).
28. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/3

6

Tudor and Tudor: Stem Cell Patentability in the EU

2019]

STEM CELL PATENTABILITY IN THE EU

983

originally designated for in vitro fertilization, donated gametes, fetal cells
from abortion, and embryos created by somatic cell nuclear transfer.29
Stem cell research in Israel is conducted without much controversy and
the country has a very successful industry. 30
One of the most difficult ethical issues within stem cell research is how
to compensate those who have made physical donations to the research
and, if so, to make sure the donations are equal and that donations are
never made as the result of coercion.31 One approach to compensation is
an equity-based solution whereby the donor gets a share of the proceeds
obtained from the successful research project.32 Problematically, women
who are not in a country with a reliable legal structure, are not covered by
bioethics laws, not living in a country reflective of a feminist-influenced
society, and/or lack adequate income could be taken advantage of in these
donor transactions.33
Perhaps one international legal and social standard that exists is the
prohibition against the development, implantation, and research on
human embryos 14 days after fertilization. Most European countries, as
well as Region X, and countries Y and Z, follow this standard.34 However,
although this 14-day rule has been followed since human embryological
research began in earnest in the 1970s, there is now pressure to move to a
28-day rule allowing embryos to be kept alive for a longer period of time
given that the research has advanced with much support from some
bioethicists.35 Regardless, despite this one example, the variety of cultures
and social, historical, and religious differences have made it difficult to
adopt a common set of ethics within the EU to guide biomedical
research.36
Being that thirty-five percent of all patent applications with stem cell
technology as the subject matter are filed with the European Patent Office
(“EPO”) or the United States Patent and Trademark, it is important to
understand the EU’s and U.S.’s stances on the morality debate.37
C. The Morality Debate in the EU.
The moral status of the human embryo is a constant source of debate
29. Id. at 131.
30. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 45.
31. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 57.
32. Id. at 107.
33. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 49.
34. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 27.
35. A Debate is Needed over Embryo Research Limits, FINANCIAL TIMES (August 8, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/40f521ac-9ef0-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4.
36. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 26.
37. Hoxha, supra note 10, at 603-604.
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among politicians, philosophers, theologians, as well as the average
citizen.38 Within the EU, the European Group on Ethics, an advisory
board to the European Commission on matters of science and new
technologies, is one of the main sources of authority that has spoken to
the controversy of the morality of patenting stem cell research.39 The
Group suggests that the moral debate is not just about what is a human
life, but also about the application of the research and resulting
therapies.40 Much of the controversy is one of ethics; it is questioned
whether stem cell research should be conducted when some consider it
immoral to engage in an activity that leads to the destruction of a human
embryo.41
The moral status of the human embryo is a constant source of debate
among politicians, philosophers, theologians, as well as the average
citizen.42 The issue of morality in biotech research in Europe likely began
in the 1980s.43 The debate began focusing on stem cell research conducted
in Europe at roughly the same time.44 The debate was further stoked in
1996 when stem cell-related research led to the cloning of Dolly the sheep
in the United Kingdom.45 There is some evidence that the media continues
to shape biomedical research policy as such news affects politicians,
religious representatives, and researchers.46
Controversy has surrounded human embryonic stem cell research since
the first scientists extracted an embryo from a human body.47 Many
unanswered questions remain in this area of research including the
definitions of “human embryo” and “life.”48 The social construction of
the human embryo sets the stage for the debate on research and funding
for stem cell-related activities.49 The fundamental question of whether the
human embryo could become a person does not have a simple answer, yet
the answer is crucial because it plays a role in determining the human
38. R. Alta Charo, Ethical and Policy Considerations in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in
HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 312 (J Ororico, S.-C. Zhang, & R. Pedersen eds. 2005).
39. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 23.
40. GOTTWEIS ET. AL , supra note 5, at 4.
41. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 5.
42. R. Alta Charo, Ethical and Policy Considerations in Embryonic Stem Cell Research, in
HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS 312 (J Ororico, S.-C. Zhang, & R. Pedersen eds. 2005).
43. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 28-29.
44. Laura Palazzani, Embryo Research in Italy: The Bioethical and Biojuridical Debate, 17
HUMAN REPRODUCTION AND GENETIC ETHICS 28 (2012).
45. GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 21, at 61.
46. Cristina Rodriquez Luque, Framing Bioethics: A Decade of Controversy over Stem Cell
Research in the Spanish Press—El Pais and ABC (1996-2006), 3 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
SCIENCE IN SOCIETY 79 (2012).
47. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 5.
48. Id. at 5.
49. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 32.
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embryo’s legal status.50 Although the assumption is that humans have
greater value than other living organisms, the potential destruction of a
human embryo may be justified to help those suffering from a disease.51
In Europe, the debate is often solved through a balancing test of the
usefulness of what may be developed from stem cell research on the onehand and the severity of the violation of public order on the other.52 In an
attempt to reduce the controversy associated with stem cell research,
governments and non-governmental organizations have attempted to
develop uniform standards for research activities so that scientists are
better equipped to make personal and professional choices as to what type
of research should be pursued, where it should be pursued, and how the
research should be funded.53
The approach to establishing rights for human embryos has ranged
from assigning embryos full rights as if it is a human all the way to
virtually no rights such that it is treated no different than any other cell.54
In a majority of EU member-states, a human embryo has a unique status
which exists somewhere between that of less than a full human but more
than just a cluster of cells.55 Regardless of the different perspectives
across the EU, the competing ethical views find their way into the law of
the member-states and therefore the law serves as a reflection of societal
viewpoints.56
When a product or process involves the use of internal human material,
ethical questions arise.57 Critics of biomedical research fear that a living
organism could be commercialized and seen as a profit opportunity, such
that health and safety risks are set aside which consequently could cause
harm to humans.58 By extension, if stem cell research is considered
immoral, then it would likewise be immoral to patent a resulting
technology.59 Regardless of the immorality concern, as an example, the
exclusion of patentability due to a violation of public order or based on
morality in Europe is rare.60

50. Id. at 33.
51. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 26.
52. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 11.
53. Baylis, supra note 25, at 31.
54. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 25.
55. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 33.
56. Baylis, supra note 25, at 33.
57. Tamera Hervey, EU Health Law, in EUROPEAN UNION LAW 642 (Catherine Barnard & Steve
Peers, eds., 2014).
58. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 20.
59. Id. at 6.
60. HOFFMANN EITLE, THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION FOR FOREIGN PRACTITIONERS 58
(2017).
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D. The Morality Debate in the U.S.
What is patentable subject matter is a sign of societal approval.61
Within stem cell research, morality has been a bigger issue in Europe than
in the United States, where patents are routinely granted for innovations
resulting from stem cell research without a concern for morality.62 In
contrast to European law, U.S. law does not have a specific prohibition
on stem cell-related patents.63 In fact, isolated stem cells have been
considered patentable subject matter in the U.S. for many years. 64 Some
believe that since U.S. law is so permissive on the subject of
biotechnology, U.S. law suggests that life itself may be patentable.65
Thirty-five percent of all patent applications with stem cell technology
as the subject matter are filed in the United States Patent and Trademark
Office and the European Patent Office (“EPO”).66 It should also be noted
that in the U.S., access to embryonic stem cells is federally monitored
while extraction of adult stem cells from a patient’s body remains
unregulated.67 Within the federal regulation, stem cell research is more
likely to regulated while the resulting therapies are not subject to strict
regulation.68
E. The promise of stem cell research.
Stem cell research is not only a scientific endeavor. The manner of
performing such research also reflects what is acceptable within the
political and social realm of a country’s culture.69 What is patentable
drives scientific research in a particular direction and patent law itself
serves as a form of encouragement or discouragement.70 Taken together,
the subject matter that is patentable by a country’s intellectual property
law is not only designed to promote innovation but also to foster social
participation and market growth in a particular field.71
The promise of stem cell research begins with the estimate that
61. Christopher J. Asakiewicz, Separation of Church and State While Promoting the Progress of
Biotechnology and Modern Science: Does Morality Have Its Place in United States Patents?, 7 J. INT.
COMMER. LAW TECHNOL 81 (2012).
62. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 5-6.
63. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 12.
64. ANTOINETTE F. KONSKI, PATENTING STEM CELL TECHNOLOGIES: MAKING A CLAIM 31
(2013).
65. Asakiewicz, supra note 63, at 83.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Jeneen Interlandi, Could This Cell Save Your Life?, 83 CONSUMER REPORTS 38 (2018).
Id. at 40.
GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 11.
BARNARD & PEERS, supra note 59, at 643.
PILA, supra note 16, at 3.
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therapies resulting from such research could help 300 million people in
the United States, Japan, and the European Union.72 Countries that choose
to encourage stem cell research by offering patents for its innovations
often see stem cell research as an avenue that will address problems felt
by its aging population.73 Stem cell therapies have also been used in
clinical settings to successfully attack diseases already impacting the
patient.74
The biggest promise of stem cell research is that it could lead to organ
regenerating technologies that can cure damaged or diseased cells in
humans.75 Both adult and embryonic stem cells can contribute to this big
promise.76 Besides the ability to attack many diseases, stem cell
technology can also be used to test and screen certain pharmaceuticals.77
Thus, using stem cell testing can be an avenue through which a country
can discourage pharmaceutical testing on animals and humans.78
The challenge of determining patentability of stem cell research and
biotechnology, and thus its utility, partially rests on separating what is
considered nature and what is produced separately by way of human
invention.79 Specifically, the promise of stem cell technology lies partially
in the debate between whether biotechnology can produce something that
is patentable and the uncertain implications of patentability. 80 The
discussion as to whether stem cell research activities can lead to
patentable inventions also involves weighing the ethical concerns
associated with commercialization and the potential for life-saving
therapies.81 What has helped both quell the debate on stem cell research,
and thus, improve the prospects of stem cell therapies is the fact that other,
new methods to obtain stem cells for research purposes now exist such as
obtaining them through somatic cell nuclear transfer, parthenogenesis,
and/or the inducement of pluripotent stem cells.82
F. The mechanics of patenting stell cell research innovations in Europe.
The purpose of a patent is to provide the inventor with exclusive rights

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

GOTTWEIS ET. AL, supra note 5, at 32.
Id. at 14-15.
DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 7.
Id. at 7.
PILA, supra note 16, at 101.
DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 5.
PILA, supra note 16, at 123.
Id. at 101-102.
HUBEL, supra note 9, at 10.
Id. at 26-28.
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to the patented subject matter for a limited time period.83 Like elsewhere,
patents issued in Europe are limited-term monopoly rights for an
invention whereby the rights are granted by each individual memberstate.84 An inventor seeking a patent in an EU member-state may apply to
the EPO or to that member-state’s patent office, directly.85 There are
currently 38 member-states that are a party to the European Patent
Convention (“EPC”).86
The first step to achieving a patent is making sure the invention is
patentable subject matter.87 The EPC created the EPO and also created the
substantive law as to what is patentable in the EU.88 Where the inventor
meets the criteria subject to the EPC, the EPO may issue a “European
Patent” that provides patent rights in the 38 member-states.89
Some of the Rules that the EPC stated are relevant to the patentability
of stem cell research. Article 53(a) of the EPC prohibits patenting
inventions where the commercial exploitation of the subject matter would
be contrary to public order or morality. 90 Rule 28 of the EPC prohibits
patenting the process for cloning humans and processes for modifying the
germ line genetic identify of humans.91 Rule 29 of the EPC prohibits the
patentability of the human body, internal human material at the various
stages of development of the human body, the simple discovery of an
element of the human body, gene sequences, and partial gene sequences.92
The TRIPS Agreement also disallows patentability for inventions that
may infringe upon public order or morality grounds.93 The TRIPS
Agreement defines public order and morality in a way that a party to the
TRIPS Agreement may rely on this provision to protect human life and/or
other concerns.94
Patent law in the EU is complex in that the EPC works alongside the

83. BARNARD & PEERS, supra note 59, at 643.
84. PILA, supra note 16, at 113.
85. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 6.
86. These member-states include the 28 EU member-states as well as Albania, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey. PLOMER,
supra note 17, at 6.
87. Hoxha, supra note 10, at 590.
88. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 6.
89. Id.
90. Convention on the Grant of European Patents [hereinafter “EPC”] of 5 October 1973 as revised
by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November
2000, Art. 53(a).
91. EPC, Rule 28.
92. EPC, Rule 29.
93. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 25. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
94. GUPTA, supra note 21, at 21. TRIPS Agreement.
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patent regimes in each member-state.95 Even in cases where stem cell
research cannot be patented, EU law generally allows the marketing and
commercialization of such products and processes developed from
research.96
Article 168 (ex 152, 129) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (hereinafter “TFEU”) provides EU governing bodies
with the ability to regulate the derivatives of human blood and organs but
also allows member-states to impose more stringent protections.97 The
95. EITLE, supra note 62, at 13.
96. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 180.
97. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 168,
Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (C326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. Article 168 (ex 152, 129) of the TFEU reads:
1. A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and
implementation of all Union policies and activities. Union action, which shall complement
national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing physical
and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental
health. Such action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting
research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health
information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating serious crossborder threats to health. The Union shall complement the Member States' action in reducing
drugs-related health damage, including information and prevention. 2. The Union shall
encourage cooperation between the Member States in the areas referred to in this Article
and, if necessary, lend support to their action. It shall in particular encourage cooperation
between the Member States to improve the complementarity of their health services in
cross-border areas. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among
themselves their policies and programmes in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. The
Commission may, in close contact with the Member States, take any useful initiative to
promote such coordination, in particular initiatives aiming at the establishment of
guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best practice, and the preparation
of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation. The European
Parliament shall be kept fully informed. 3. The Union and the Member States shall foster
cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere
of public health. 4. By way of derogation from Article 2(5) and Article 6(a) and in
accordance with Article 4(2)(k) the European Parliament and the Council, acting in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall contribute to the achievement
of the objectives referred to in this Article through adopting in order to meet common safety
concerns: (a) measures setting high standards of quality and safety of organs and substances
of human origin, blood and blood derivatives; these measures shall not prevent any
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures; (b)
measures in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their direct objective the
protection of public health; (c) measures setting high standards of quality and safety for
medicinal products and devices for medical use. 5. The European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, may also adopt
incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health and in particular to
combat the major cross-border health scourges, measures concerning monitoring, early
warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health, and measures which have
as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding tobacco and the abuse of
alcohol, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. 6.
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may also adopt recommendations for
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Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions of 6 July
1998 (the “Biotech Directive” or “Directive 98/44/EC”), despite its
controversial evolution, was necessary because it provided a pathway for
the EU member-states could compete with the U.S. and other countries.98
Using their powers, some individual member-states took action to
develop the stem cell research industry. For example, the United
Kingdom’s Stem Cell Initiative was designed to foster investment by
large pharmaceutical firms.99
The Biotech Directive was one of the most controversial and
politicized pieces of EU legislation ever, taking ten years to complete.100
The Biotech Directive should be viewed as a political compromise among
many points of view on the subject.101 The compromise was necessary
due to the cultural, religious, economic, and historical diversity across the
EU.102 For example, German constitutional law provides a right to science
and research but stem cell research in Germany also competes with other
constitutional rights such as the rights to personality, life, and personal
integrity.103 In effect, the Biotech Directive reproduces provisions of the
EPC, codifies the EPC case law, and clarifies ambiguities within the
EPC.104 The Biotech Directive remains the only substantive patent
legislation on the subject matter at the EU level.105 Although it is not an
organization of the EU, the EPO uses the Biotech Directive in matters of
patentability which in theory should allow for greater harmonization of
law across Europe.106 However, the EPO does not take direction from the
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) which could threaten harmonization if
the EPO at any time decided that its jurisprudence should separate.107
Regardless, the ECJ is the de facto authority on both individual EU
member-state patents and European patents if the litigation in question

the purposes set out in this Article. 7. Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the
Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery
of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall include
the management of health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources
assigned to them. The measures referred to in paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national
provisions on the donation or medical use of organs and blood.
98. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 8.
99. DEVANEY, supra note 1, at 9.
100. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 3-4.
101. Id. at 26.
102. PLOMER, supra note 17, at 29.
103. Barbara Advena-Regnery, Hans-Georg Dederer, Franziska Enghofer, Tobias Cantz, &
Thomas Heinemann, Framing the Ethical and Legal Issues of Human Artificial Gametes in Research,
Therapy, and Assisted Reproduction: A German Perspective, 32 BIOETHICS 317 (2018).
104. PILA, supra note 16, at 129.
105. Id.
106. HUBEL, supra note 9, at 35.
107. Id.
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begins in an EU member-state.108
Despite efforts at creating a fully harmonized body of patent law in the
EU, a unitary body of patent law does not yet exist. Consequently, higher
costs exist for inventors attempting to secure and enforce patent rights on
the European continent.109 However, over the years, the ECJ has drawn
the European continent closer to a unified body of patent law through its
harmonizing decisions.110
A natural tension still exists in European patent law between the right
to prohibit others from copying the technology and a purchaser’s right to
resell the patented product purchased by that consumer.111 This tension is
somewhat resolved by EU law which allows a purchaser to sell the
purchased personal property as the owner sees fit.112 Therefore, the patent
granted in Europe only extends to the prohibition of bringing the
technology to the marketplace without permission.113 This exhaustion of
rights doctrine does not allow a patent holder to block the entry of a
patented good into another member-state once it has been freely and
legally available in another member-state.114 The regulation of the sale of
non-patented human tissue research is covered by Directive
2004/23/EC.115
EU law, generally, does regulate blood, organs, and human tissue
through both regulations and patent law.116 The protection of human
dignity and integrity is considered to be a guiding principle of the
Directive 98/44/EC.117 However, human dignity is rarely mentioned in
member-state constitutions despite the use of the phrase in many
international documents.118 The definition of a human embryo becomes
crucial in European patent law so that patentability can be established.119

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
Donation,
and Cells.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
PILA, supra note 16, at 113.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Directive 2004/23/EC of March 31, 2004, on Setting Standards of Quality and Safety for the
Procurement, Testing, Processing, Preservation, Storage, and Distribution of Human Tissues
BARNARD & PEERS, supra note 59, at 642.
GUPTA, supra note 21, at 23.
PLOMER, supra note 17, at 217.
GUPTA, supra note 21, at 29-30.
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II. THE SCIENCE OF STEM CELLS.
A. Application.
Scientists first discovered stem cells in the 1950s in the marrow of long
bones.120 Scientists then discovered the high levels of plasticity of
embryonic stem cells in the 1980s largely by studying mice. 121 By the
1990s, scientists proposed that stem cells could regenerate organs such as
the heart, liver, and nervous system.122 Human stem cells were first
collected in 1998 by two research teams working independently—one
team discovered the presence of stem cells from five-day-old blastocysts
(a mammalian embryo in its early stages of development) and the second
team discovered the presence of stem cells in two- to four-month old
fetuses garnered from elective abortions.123
The goal of most stem cell therapies is to produce new cells to replace
cells that have died, as well as delivering new cells to parts of the body
that need but lack them.124 Stem cell therapies require the cells to be
injected into a patient akin to an organ transplant.125 Examples of stem
cell therapy include injecting new muscle cells into a failing heart or
neurons into a brain affected by a stroke.126
Because stem cells are unspecialized, they hold the potential to grow
bone tissue, cartilage, nerves, organs, and even breast tissue.127
Embryonic stem cells, because of their plasticity, have a greater ability to
differentiate compared to adult stem cells.128 Cells from embryos can
create all of a human’s structures, including specialized cells, tissues, and
organs.129 On the other hand, stem cells that replace lost cells in specific
organs have limited plasticity, having only the ability to produce cells of
specific tissue.130 However, these tissue-specific cells which can only be
harvested post-natal could still be used to renew or repair existing
tissue.131 For example, stem cells collected from umbilical cords are
uniquely capable of treating a multitude of blood diseases such as
120.
121.
5 (2006).
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

LYGIA V. PEREIRA, STEM CELLS: PROMISE AND REALITY 15 (2017).
JOSEPH PANNO, STEM CELL RESEARCH: MEDICAL APPLICATIONS & ETHICAL CONTROVERSY
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 17.
PANNO, supra note 125, at 18-19.
JONATHAN SLACK, STEM CELLS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 10 (2012).
PANNO, supra note 125, at 59.
SLACK, supra note 128, at 10-11.
JOSEPH CHRISTIANO, STEM CELL REVOLUTION 14 (2018).
PANNO, supra note 125, at 1.
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 2-3.
Id. at 11.
SLACK, supra note 128, at 70.
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leukemia, lymphoma, anemia, and human immune diseases.132
B. Garnering stem cells.
A stem cell is a cell that can reproduce itself and also general offspring
of different functional cell types.133 There are five types of stem cells:
embryonic stem cells (garnered from an early developmental stage or
embyro), fetal (garnered from a fetus), amniotic (garnered from amniotic
fluid garnered from a routine amniocentesis procedure), post-natal
(garnered from an umbilical cord or tissue from a healthy, live birth), and
adult stem cells (garnered from a living human).134
Despite these five categories, stem cells are usually divided into two
groups: embryonic stem cells and adult stem cells. 135 Embryonic stem
cells originate from cells associated with the early embryo. 136 They are
generally derived from a pre-implantation embryo.137 Embryonic stem
cells of a mammal are obtained exclusively from the inner cell mass of a
blastocyst and when placed in a culture, can transform into many types of
cells.138 The stem cells with the most therapeutic potential are the cells
derived from a fertilized egg which can transform into an entire organism
because they are totipotent—meaning they have almost unlimited
potential for development.139
The therapeutic advantage of embryonic stem cells is that they can
become any type of cell, meaning they are pluripotent, while adult stem
cells can give rise to just a limited number of types of cells. 140 Adult stem
cells are harvested post-birth from umbilical cords and/or placentas.141
The types of proteins embedded in the membrane of an embryonic stem
are different than those of an adult stem cell.142
The therapeutic advantage of embryonic stem cells is that they can
become any type of cell, meaning they are pluripotent, while adult stem
cells can give rise to just a limited number of types of cells.143

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 26.
Id. at 2.
NEIL H. RIORDAN, STEM CELL THERAPY: A RISING TIDE 37 (2017).
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 12-13.
SLACK, supra note 128, at 5.
CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 9.
PANNO, supra note 125, at 5.
Id. at 5.
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 43. MARK BERMAN & ELLIOT LANDER, THE STEM CELL
REVOLUTION 1 (2015).
141. Id. at 13.
142. PANNO, supra note 125, at 1.
143. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 43. MARK BERMAN & ELLIOT LANDER, THE STEM CELL
REVOLUTION 1 (2015).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

17

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3

994

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

Cell differentiation is the process by which the genes of a cell and the
external environment interact to produce specialized cells such as liver
cells, heart cells, and bone cells.144 Cell differentiation can occur in one
of three ways: spontaneously, through a process called directed
differentiation which allows cells to contact each other, or when the
culture medium is provided with certain growth factors.145 Stimulating the
cell cultures using growth factors will focus the differentiation toward a
particular type of cell.146 The first stage of differentiation divides the
embryo into four groups of cells, all of which become progressively
differentiated and specialized into various tissues and organs.147 Scientists
consider embryonic stem cells to be “undifferentiated” because they can
divide without limit and, most likely, become all of the various cell types
found in the human body.”148 Stem cells can also divide and regenerate
for an indefinite period of time after they are harvested. 149 Similar to
embryotic cells, stem cells can also differentiate into more than one type
of cell.150 Cell differentiation, when taking place in the embryo, allows
cells to take on specific forms and functions.151 In a laboratory, embryonic
stem cells can respond to various forms of stimuli.152
Embryonic stem cells can be extracted from embryos beginning in the
third day of development when an embryo is made up of 100 cells. These
100 cells can be divided into placenta cells or those developing into all
adult tissues.153 During extraction, the inner cell mass is removed from
the blastocyst and multiplied in a way that embryonic stem cells are
produced in large quantities and perhaps can serve as an unlimited source
for transplants.154 If the association between the inner cell mass and the
trophoblast is disrupted, the embryonic stem cell cannot develop into an
embryo.155
Currently, there is no way to remove an embryonic stem cell from the
inner core mass of a blastocyst without killing the embryo. 156 Once human
embryonic stem cells are collected, they are grown in a culture and
stimulated in several ways to determine the kinds of cells into which they
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 10.
PANNO, supra note 125, at 3.
Id. at 26.
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 3.
SLACK, supra note 128, at 5.
CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 8.
PANNO, supra note 125, at 1.
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 2.
Id. at 46.
PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 43.
Id. at 43.
PANNO, supra note 125, at 5.
Id. at 23.
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may differentiate.157 Stem cells can also be harvested from umbilical
cords after birth and stored later for therapeutic treatment.158 These “cord
cells” can also produce blood cells and are commonly used to treat cancer
patients.159
C. Limitations.
There are academics that argue that the promise of stem cell research
therapy has been overstated and that there exist significant obstacles and
limitations associated with stem cell research.160 First, they argue,
regardless of the method of stem cell therapy, donor compatibility is still
an issue; because the issue of compatibility exists, the industry associated
with the banking of umbilical cords after a person’s birth is growing.161 A
recent example of the problems associated with donor compatibility is the
success researchers have found treating beta-thalassemia, an inherited
blood disorder, that affects only 228,000 people worldwide. Despite the
success from to a new treatment, that success is dependent upon finding
a donor match as to avoid other health risks.162
Second, academics argue that most of what we know about stem cells
comes from studying mice and rats.163 Clinical trials involving stem cells
and humans did not occur until 2010 largely due to safety concerns
associated with injecting stem cells into the human body.164 Research
suggests that stem cells from other mammals can’t be used to cure
diseases in humans.165 Consequently, critics argue that it is too early to
say that stem cell therapies are safe for human use.166
Third, critics argue that biomedical research is quite expensive. A
research team focusing on the standard practice of testing on animals
followed by four stages of human application can range between
$500,000 and $3 billion.167 Due to the cost associated with biomedical
research, most activity in this area is conducted by pharmaceutical
firms.168
157. Id. at 24.
158. CHRISTIANO, supra note 131, at 9.
159. Id.
160. PANNO, supra note 125, at 61.
161. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 27.
162. Sarah Troy, Gene Therapy Shows Promise in Patients with a Blood Disorder, WALL ST. J.
(April 19, 2018: 4:21AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gene-therapy-shows-promise-in-patients-witha-blood-disorder-1524085227?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3.
163. PANNO, supra note 125, at 18.
164. PEREIRA, supra note 124, at 58-59.
165. PANNO, supra note 125, at 18.
166. SLACK, supra note 128, at 39.
167. Id. at 51.
168. Id.
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Fourth, and more directly related to science, critics argue that
embryonic stem cells do not compare well to adult tissue as the former
are programmed to become fetuses and therefore can grow too rapidly in
a context other than pregnancy when the two types of cells are forced to
interact.169
Lastly, critics fear on grounds that the science behind it is unsafe, that
stem cell research will lead to the cloning of humans despite the fact that
human cloning has never occurred and virtually all scientists oppose it for
safety reasons.170
III. HIGHLIGHTS OF STATUTORY LAW REGULATING THE STEM CELL
INDUSTRY IN EUROPE.
A. The European Patent Convention.
Article 52(1) of the EPC states that inventions can be protected by a
patent in all fields of technology so long as the invention is new, involves
an inventive step, and is susceptible of industrial application.171 However,
Article 52(2) enumerates what is not an invention and thus not patentable
and includes scientific theories, mathematical methods, aesthetic
creations, business methods, rules for playing games, computer programs,
and presentations of information.172 Article 53 specifies exceptions to
patentability, separate from what is not considered an invention pursuant
to Article 52(2), and includes inventions for which the commercial
exploitation would be contrary to a member-state’s public order or
morality, plant varieties, animal varieties, biological processes for the
production of plants or animals, and methods for the treatment of the
human or animal body by surgery, therapy, or diagnostic methods
practiced on the human or animal body.173
Rule 28 (ex 23d) of the EPC further expands upon the exceptions to
patentability found in Article 53.174 Specifically, Rule 28 prohibits
processes for cloning human beings, processes for modifying the germ
line genetic identity of human beings, uses of human embryos for
industrial or commercial purposes, and processes for modifying the
genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering
without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

BERMAN & LANDER, supra note 135, at 1.
SLACK, supra note 128, at 37.
EPC, Article 52.
Id.
Id.
EPC, Rule 28.
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animals resulting from such processes.175 Rule 29 (ex 23e) of the EPC
prohibits the human body from patentability including any stage of human
development, the simple discovery of one of the human body’s elements,
and the sequence or partial sequence of a gene from patentability. 176
However, Rule 29 does allow for the patentability of an element isolated
from the human body or produced by a technical process which could
include the sequencing of a gene or partial sequencing of a gene even if
what is produced (i.e., the element) is identical to the natural element.177
However, any attempt to patent a process including the sequencing or
partial sequencing of a gene must be fully disclosed in the patent
application.178
B. The TRIPs Agreement.
Article 27 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (“TRIPs Agreement”) has nearly identical language to Article
52 of the EPC. This language provides that an invention is patentable if it
is (1) new, (2) involves an inventive step, and (3) is capable of industrial
application. 179 Article 27 also states that member-states may prohibit
inventions for which a member-state believes it needs to prohibit
patentability to protect public order and morality, to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health, and/to protect the environment.180
Additionally, Article 27 allows member-states to prohibit the patenting of
inventions for (1) diagnosis, therapy, and surgical methods for humans or
animals; and (2) biological processes for the production of plants or
animals. 181 However, the TRIPs Agreement, unlike the EPC, is not
mandatory.
C. Directive 98/44/EC.
Directive 98/44/EC is the chief statutory source of law promulgated by
the EU governing stem cell research despite its broader scope to define
the legal protection for all biological inventions.182 In the fairly lengthy
preamble to Directive 98/44/EC, that the European Parliament and the
European Council recognized that there existed deep divisions and many
175. EPC, Rule 28.
176. EPC, Rule 29.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. TRIPs Agreement, Art. 27.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal
protection of biotechnological inventions 1998 O.J. (L 213).
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approaches as to how the various member-states protected biological
inventions.183 If these diverging approaches were to continue, the EU’s
common market could be threatened.184 The preamble also, however,
specifically acknowledges the need to safeguard and respect the dignity
and integrity of persons and the human body at virtually all stages of
development.185
Article 3 of Directive 98/44/EC defines the general framework for the
patentability of a biological invention including that the invention is new,
involves an inventive step which is susceptible to industrial application.
Specific to biological inventions, Article 3 states that biological material
that is isolated from its natural environment by way of a technical process
can also be patented even if that same biological material previously
occurred in nature.186 Article 1 immediately strikes a balance between
national and international law stating that, although inventions are to be
protected pursuant to a member-state’s national law, member-states must
adhere to the principles of EU law and other international agreements
such as the TRIPs Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity.187 Article 2 broadly defines biological material as any genetic
material capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a biological
system.188 Article 6 serves as a significant limitation on the patentability
of biological inventions, in the form of an exception even if the
requirements of Article 3 are met by an inventor, in that biological
inventions that through commercial exploitation would be contrary to
public order and morality cannot be patented with exact prohibitions
identified by category including the cloning of human beings, a process
for modifying the genetic identity of a human being, the use of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and the a process for
modifying the genetic identify of animals.189
Articles 15 and 16 are administrative in context yet are quite important.
Article 15 orders member-states to align their law with the requirements
of Directive 98/44/EC by July 30, 2000 and by doing so must provide in
law a reference to this Directive but allows each member-state to
unilaterally determine how this reference shall be found within its law.190
Article 16 requires the EU to develop a report that identifies any issues
associated with the harmonization of law governed by Directive 98/44/EC

183.
184.
185.
186.
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188.
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and conflicts with international agreements germane to Directive
98/44/EC.191
D. Directive 2004/23/EC.
The focus of Directive 2004/23/EC aims to promote the biological
innovation industry by ensuring the safety of the industry and the quality
of the industry’s products.192 The range of regulation for this Directive
includes the procurement, testing, processing, storage, and distribution of
human tissues and cells across the EU.193 Under Directive 2004/23/EC,
regulation extends specifically to blood, umbilical cord and bone marrow
stem cells, reproductive cells including eggs and sperm, fetal tissues, adult
stem cells, and embryonic stem cells.194 Although stem cells are not
specifically identified, the term “cells” is defined in Article 3 as
“individual human cells or a collection of human cells when not bound by
any form of connective tissue.” Article 5 articulates that professionals
working within this industry and their employers must be well certified,
have training and expertise, and must be employed by an entity operating
with approval from a member-state’s proper authority.195 Article 7
requires that member-states put into place an inspection regime whereby
inspections are performed when serious incidents occur.196 Relatedly,
Article 8 requires the member-state’s regulatory regime to develop a
process whereby donated human tissue and cells can be traced to the
donor while Article 14 requires that all information including information
concerning the donor’s genetics remains confidential.197
E. Directive 2015/566/EU.
Much like Directive 2004/23/EC (discussed supra ), Directive
2016/566 sets standards for industry safety regarding the donation,
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage, and distribution
of human tissues and cells.198 This Directive places significant emphasis
on consumer protection and the inspection of imported human tissues and
191. Id.
192. Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation,
storage and distribution of human tissues and cells 2004 O.J. (L 103).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Commission Directive (EU) 2015/566 of 8 April 2015 implementing Directive 2004/23/EC
as regards the procedures for verifying the equivalent standards of quality and safety of imported tissues
and cells Text with EEA relevance 2015 O.J. (L 93).
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cells.199 This ensures that professionals and certified professional
establishments are the routine providers of these services.200 Those
involved in these activities should be authorized and licensed by a
member-state’s regulatory regime.201 Article 1 makes clear that the
Directive applies to any human tissues and cells that will be the subject
of human application yet were imported into the EU but are not subject to
Directive 2004/23/EC.202 Article 3 states that any entity having the desire
to import human cells and tissues must do so by using the services of
establishments that are accredited, designated, authorized, or licensed by
the proper legal authority of the member-state and any importation must
have prior approval from a member-state’s legal authority.203
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WORK.
There are five aspirations for this work. First, this work seeks to inform
the practitioner of the scope, limitations, and environment of stem cell
and biotechnological research and patentability in the EU which will
include the basic law of patentability but also a dive into related issues of
law in this area. Second, this work should make the practitioner aware of
the issues of morality that affect the legal environment encompassing
stem cell and biotechnological research and patentability in European
countries. Third, this work will describe the interplay between the ECJ
and the European Patent Office including the latter’s judicial bodies.
Fourth, a set of threats to the harmonization of law on the subject of stem
cell and biotechnological research will be identified. Lastly, a body of
recommendations will be identified that could assist EU and EPC
member-states in their attempts to harmonize law across the European
continent.
V. CASE LAW FROM THE ECJ REGARDING STEM CELL RESEARCH AND
RELATED RESEARCH.
A. Patentability.
The ECJ’s decision in The Netherlands v. Parliament is critical to
understanding the scope and limitations of patentability. In that case, three
member-state governments challenged Directive 98/44/EC almost as

199.
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soon as the Directive became law. 204 The challenging countries first
complained that the Directive was not within the scope of authority
granted to the EU governmental bodies designed to protect the
functioning of the internal market.205 The ECJ disagreed stating that the
Directive clearly was designed to make sure that all member-states were
acting uniformly on issues associated with biotechnological inventions
that would otherwise interfere with trade across the member-states.206
Additionally, the ECJ remarked that Directive 98/44/EC was crafted to
address divergent points of view across the member-states on the
patentability of inventions relating to the human body and plant varieties
and that such divergent mentalities could damage trade, where, in regard
to a particular subject matter, some member-states might grant patent
protection and others may not.207 According to the ECJ, differences in
patentability of the same subject matter could not only cause problems
associated with trade across member-state borders, but could also create
conflicts with various international trade agreements to which the EU’s
member-states are a party.208 However, the ECJ was careful to point out
that Directive 98/44/EC does not create an EU-wide patent and that any
patent granted is a patent granted only by a member-state government.209
The ECJ also noted that the Directive was needed to establish
harmonization regarding biotechnological inventions because such
uniformity could not be established by the member-states acting on their
own.210
Most interestingly the challenging member-states expressed concerns
that Directive 98/44/EC did not harmonize the law on patentability.
Instead, they argued, the directive created the possibility of divergent laws
among the member-states due to the ability of member-states to prohibit
the patenting of inventions that violate public order and morality.211 The
ECJ admitted that although allowing member-states to prohibit the
patenting of inventions that violate morality and public order gave
member-state governments and their courts “a wide scope,” this result
was desirable because each member-state is best-suited to determine what

204. Case C-377/98, Kingdom of The Netherlands, supported by the Italian Republic and the
Kingdom of Norway v. the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, [2001] ECR I7079, at ¶ 1. Norway was a party to the action due to its concern that Directive 98/44/EC would interfere
with the Agreement on the European Economic Area. Id. at ¶ 6.
205. Id. at ¶ 13.
206. Id. at ¶ 7.
207. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
208. Id. at ¶¶ 19-22.
209. Id. at ¶¶ 25.
210. Id. at ¶ 32.
211. Id. at ¶ 35.
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its culture and social context will tolerate.212 Many international
agreements give parties to those agreements similar latitude in
determining patentable subject matter. 213 Further, the ECJ made clear that
Directive 98/44/EC provides guidelines to member-states as to how to
apply a sense of public order and morality; mere commercial exploitation
of the subject matter is not contrary to public order and morality simply
because it is contrary to national law. 214 More subtly, the ECJ provided
that the slight difference in language between the Directive and the EPC
did not put the Directive in jeopardy. .215
More specific to human biotechnology, the ECJ stated that the absence
of a requirement in Directive 98/44/EC that a human donor of biological
material provide consent did not violate the EU right of self-determination
that would nullify the Directive.216 The ECJ contended that it is the ECJ’s
responsibility to safeguard the fundamental right to human dignity and
integrity.217 The Directive itself provides language prohibiting the
patentability of the human body at various stages of formation and
development.218 Directive 98/44/EC’s prohibitions on human
patentability are sufficient to protect against violations of human dignity
and integrity along with the more specific prohibitions against
patentability including processes for cloning of human beings, uses of
human embryos, and the processes for modifying germ line genetic
identity.219 Importantly, to any researcher in this field, the ECJ also
pointed out that Directive 98/44/EC does not address whether certain
forms of research are permitted, to which member-states may address on
their own, and only addresses the patentability of subject matter.220
In Brustle v. Greenpeace, the ECJ faced several technical questions
regarding stem cell science including the definitions of “human embryo,”
“industrial or commercial use,” and “technical teaching.” 221 In Brustle,
Greenpeace urged the German courts to nullify a patent for, among other
things, the isolation and purification of neural precursor cells, and the
212. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.
213. Id. at ¶ 38.
214. Id. at ¶ 39.
215. Id. at ¶ 61. The prohibitive phrase used in Directive 98/44/EC is “whose commercial
exploitation would be contrary to order public or morality.” The prohibitive phrase used in the European
Patent Convention is “inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to order
public or morality.” Id. The ECJ stated that a breach of public order or morality could equally be
established by the subject matter of the invention either by publication, exploitation, or commercialization.
Id. at ¶ 62.
216. Id. at ¶ 69.
217. Id. at ¶¶ 70-71
218. Id.
219. Id. at ¶¶ 72, 74, 76.
220. Id. at ¶¶ 79, 80.
221. Case C-34/10,Brustle v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, at ¶ 23.
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process for the production of embryonic stem cells, and the use of neural
precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects. 222 Mr. Brustle
contended in his patent application that transplantation of such cells could
treat neurological diseases and that some attempts had been made prior to
treat patients with Parkinson’s disease.223 Controversially, Mr. Brustle’s
process required the transplant of immature precursor cells from the
cerebral tissue of human embryos still in their development phase.224 In
his patent application, Mr. Brustle was hopeful for the possibility of
embryonic stem cell transplants because such technology could lead to an
unlimited amount of isolated and purified cells with both neural and glial
(suited for brain and spinal cord areas) properties.225 Greenpeace’s chief
concern was that the precursor cells were obtained from human
embryonic stem cells.226
The Convention on the Grant of European Patents (“CGEP”), which
binds the individual member-states of the EU but not the EU itself, allows
for the patenting of biological inventions generally so long as the patented
product or process meets the traditional conditions of newness, inventive
step, and the potential for industrial application.227 Directive 98/44/EC
goes even further and allows patent protection for biological material,
processes developed through the use of biological material, and biological
material that is produced, processed, or used.228 The third prohibition, that
patents cannot be awarded for products and processes that violate public
order and morality and as identified by an individual member-state is
much more general and certainly more open to interpretation.229 Even
within Directive 98/44/EC’s prohibitions on morally questionable
patents, a member-state can grant a patent the use of human embryos for
therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which are applied and useful to a
human embryo.230 Further, an element of the human body (e.g., organs,
cells) that is isolated due to the identification, purification, and
classification for reproduction outside the body can be patented by a
member-state.231
German law on the patentability of biological inventions mirrors
Directive 98/44/EC but goes further in creating criminal offenses
whereby ova is fertilized for any other purpose than to impregnate a
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at ¶ 15.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 17.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 19.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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woman from which the ova originated, when a human embryo is sold after
conception either by in vitro or removed from a woman before the
nidation process has been completed in the uterus, when ova is transferred
or acquired for the use other than preservation, and when in vitro
fertilization occurs for the development of human embryos for any other
purpose than inducing pregnancy.232 German law also provides two
crucial definitions including the definition of an embryo which is defined
as a fertilized human ovum capable of develop and/or any cell removed
from a cell that is totipotent.233 In contrast, a stem cell is defined as a cell
capable of developing into any kind of cell yet cannot be developed into
a complete human being.234 but pursuant to German law can be the subject
of scientific research if several conditions are met by the researcher.235
For a stem cell to be used in scientific research, German law requires that
the stem cells (1) were obtained in compliance with the member-state’s
law, (2) were originally produced with the goal of in vitro fertilization but
became superfluous, (3) were not exchanged for remuneration, (4) were
not imported in violation of any other law, (5) were not obtained in a way
that offends the German legal order, and (6) are to be used pursuant to
“high-level” research aims.236
According to the ECJ, the EU intended to prohibit the patentability of
something whereby human dignity would be infringed upon and to make
sure that “human embryo” was well defined across the member-states.237
The ECJ stated that the definition of a human embryo, which should be
shared across the member-states, is any human ovum as soon as it is
fertilized if the fertilization is such as to commence the process of
developing a human being.238 Additionally, the ECJ contended that the
definition of human embryo must include non-fertilized ovum that has
received, by transplant into its cell nucleus, a mature human cell and nonfertilized human ovum whose division and development have been
stimulated by parthenogenesis.239 Despite these definitions, the ECJ
stated that stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst stage
are not necessarily included within the human embryo definition.240 The
ECJ allowed that member-states’ courts are free to determine whether
these stem cells should be included within the definition of human embryo
and excluded from patentability. Despite these clear-cut definitions, the
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at ¶¶ 8-11.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id. at ¶¶ 13.
Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.
Id. at ¶ 34.
Id. at ¶ 35.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Id. at ¶ 37.
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ECJ stated that stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst
stage are not necessarily included within the human embryo definition
and that national courts are free to determine, based on their interpretation
of scientific knowledge as to whether these stem cells can become human
beings, should be included within the definition of human embryo for the
purposes of the exclusion on patentability.241
The ECJ also stated that the prohibition on the use of human embryos
for industrial and commercial purposes also included a prohibition on the
use of human embryos for scientific research.242 Therefore, the ECJ held
that what is produced through human embryos for industrial and
commercial purposes, and scientific research, is not patentable. 243 The
ECJ did recognized that the aims of industrial/ commercial research are
different and Directive 98/44/EC did not separate patent eligibility based
on those aims.244 Lastly, and most harmfully to Mr. Brustle, the ECJ held
that patentability was prohibited under Directive 98/44/EC—even for
technical teaching claims.245 Mr. Brustle’s patent required stem cells
obtained from embryos at the blastocyst stage.246 This required the
destruction of human embryos.247 The ECJ contended that the embryos’
stage of development was irrelevant when the end result destroyed human
embryos at any stage.248
Although the ECJ left the final determination to member-states’ courts,
the ECJ urged uniformity in this area of law.249 First, the ECJ felt it was
important to provide a uniform definition of human embryo since
Directive 98/44/EC failed to do so.250 Second, the ECJ remarked that the
harmonization of law governing the patentability of biological inventions
across the member-states would improve the free flow of trade and
strengthen the EU’s common market while also increasing the amount of
research in the area of genetic engineering.251 Third (and most importantly
to firms trying to nullify patents on biological inventions), the ECJ stated
that different definitions of “human embryo” could incentivize firms to
patent their inventions in more flexible jurisdictions. 252 Despite the
241. Id.
242. Id. at ¶ 44.
243. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 46.
244. Id. at ¶ 43.
245. Id. at ¶ 52. when the inventor makes the argument that the harvesting of the base materials
requires the prior destruction of the human embryos and even if the technical teaching does not claim or
refer to the use of human embryos. Id.
246. Id. at ¶ 49.
247. Id.
248. Id. at ¶ 49.
249. Id. at ¶¶ 26-29, 53.
250. Id. at ¶ 26.
251. Id. at ¶ 27.
252. Id. at ¶ 28.
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aforementioned statements on the need for unity of law, the ECJ found
that Directive 98/44/EC did allow for wide discretion in regard to the
exclusions to patentability based on a member-state’s need for public
order and morale.253
In ISCC, the ECJ held that the intent of its decision in Brustle was to
state that a non-fertilized human ovum should be considered a human
embryo within the scope of Directive 98/44/EC in that such an organism
has the capability of beginning the process of development of a human
being.254 In contrast, according to the ECJ, Directive 98/44/EC must be
interpreted to mean that a non-fertilized human ovum incapable of
development of a human being cannot be a human embryo. 255 Tying these
two points together, the ECJ proclaimed that any ovum possessing the
capability of development into a human being, fertilized or not, must be
defined for the purposes of Directive 98/44/EC as a human embryo. 256
In ISCC, the ECJ relied on several provisions of Directive 98/44/EC’s
preamble to guide its reasoning. Collectively, the cited preamble
provisions make clear that although the EU recognizes the importance of
research and development in biotechnology, such research must be
regulated to safeguard human dignity and integrity. 257 Specific to this
concern for the protection of the fundamental principles and human
dignity and integrity is research of germ cells and the sequencing of
human genes either fully or partially. 258 The EU is trying to strike a
balance between specifically enumerating prohibited patents and
allowing member-states to determine which inventions violate the states’
own sense of morality and public order.259 Regardless, the preamble
makes int clear that processes developed for therapeutic and/or diagnostic
purposes can be patented.260
The ECJ further asserted that although the Directive allowed for
biotechnical inventions, it did not allow the human body—or any part of
the human body or its formation— to be patented.261 Additionally, any
biotechnological invention that violates the public order or morality of a
member-state may be prohibited from patentability.262
In this case, ISCC filed two patent applications with the United
253. Id. at ¶ 29.
254. Case C-364/13, Int’l Stem Cell Corp. v. Comptroller Gen. of Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2451, at ¶ 27.
255. Id. at ¶ 29.
256. Id. at ¶ 30.
257. Id. at ¶ 3.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at ¶ 6.
262. Id. at ¶ 7.
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Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (“UKIPO”), one for the
parthenogenetic activation of oocytes for the production of human
embryonic stem cells, and another for a synthetic cornea made from
retinal stem cells.263 The UKIPO denied both applications on grounds that
this technology involved unfertilized human ova that could, when
stimulated by parthenogenesis, develop into a human being.264 ISCC
appealed to the ECJ, arguing that Brustle merely prohibited patenting
human embryos capable of developing into a human being while ISCC
contended that its biological material could not do this.265
The ECJ had to determine whether unfertilized human ova, stimulated
by parthenogenesis and incapable of becoming human beings, are the
same as human embryos for purposes of patentability. 266 The ECJ noted
the limits on patenting biological subject matter, which did not extend to
the scientific development of biotechnology as a whole. The ECJ
furthered it’s holding from Brustle that a non-fertilized ovum is not a
human embryo for purposes of patentability, as long as any development
process involved is not sufficient to form a human being.267 However, the
ECJ also stated that if parthenogenesis can lead a human ovum (a
parthenote) to develop into a human being, that human ovum would have
to be treated like fertilized ovum and thus considered a human embryo for
the purposes of patentability under Directive 98/44/EC.268 On the subject
of the balance between these two positions, specifically whether or not
parthenogenesis can transform human ovum to a human being, the ECJ
found the more relevant question to be whether the ISCC’s method of
parthenogenesis had the capacity to develop unfertilized ova into human
beings based on current scientific knowledge.269 The ECJ left this
question open to its member-states.270
In Commission v. Italy, the ECJ addressed the question of whether Italy
had met its obligation to fully implement Directive 98/44/EC in regard to
its domestic patent law.271 Italian law recognizes patent rights for
industrial inventions that are new, involve inventive steps, and are
susceptible to industrial application.272 Regarding specific prohibitions,
Italian patent law provided that an invention is prohibited when it causes
a permanent diminution of physical integrity or is in violation of law,
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶¶ 10-12.
Id. at ¶¶ 15-18.
Id. at ¶ 20.
Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.
Id. at ¶ 31.
Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.
Id. at ¶ 36.
Case C-456/03, Comm’n v. Italy, 2005 E.C.R. I-5335, at ¶ 1.
Id. at ¶ 11.
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public policy, or if the invention allowed for a biological process to obtain
an animal breed.273 Italy’s patent law had additional prohibitive language
stating that inventions are not patentable subject matter if the exploitation
of the subject matter would be contrary to public policy and morality, yet
stated that a public policy or morality violation would be found merely
because the invention is prohibited by domestic law.274 Italian law also
provided the patentee with exclusive rights to the invention, whether a
product or process, and thus to prohibit third parties from producing,
using, marketing, or selling, or importing the product or process.275
Italian law was in contradiction to Directive 98/44/EC and Italy
conceded that it did not implement the Directive within the required time
period. The EU complained that Italian patent law did not allow for
biotechnological patents.276 The ECJ’s standard for determining
compliance with a Directive is if the member-state’s law is sufficiently
clear and precise to enable an individual to know of their rights and
responsibilities.277 There is no specific manner by which a member-state
must implement domestic legislation pursuant to a Directive.278 The
Italian government argued that the term “industrial invention” within its
domestic patent law was broad enough to include biotechnological
inventions.279 The ECJ disagreed, arguing that the definitional distinction
between Italian law and that of other member-states could create
contradictions in patent law across the EU.280 The ECJ believed that
Italian law must specifically mention the patentability of biological
material.281
The EU Commission complained that Italian law did not provide for
the patentability of an element isolated form the human body or otherwise
produced by a technical process.282 Italy responded that its definition of
the word “invention” was sufficiently inclusive.283 The ECJ disagreed,
holding that the elements of the human body are not patentable unless the
invention combines natural elements with technical processes.284 The ECJ
stated that Italian patent law was not specific enough to satisfy the

273. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 12.
274. Id. at ¶ 12.
275. Id. at ¶ 10. The patent law of Italy as well prohibited the patentability of surgical or therapeutic
processes and diagnostic procedures for the treatment of humans or animals. Id. at ¶ 11.
276. Id. at ¶ 45.
277. Id. at ¶ 51.
278. Id. at ¶ 51.
279. Id. at ¶ 55.
280. Id. at ¶ 58.
281. Id. at ¶¶ 59-61.
282. Id. at ¶ 63.
283. Id. at ¶ 65.
284. Id. at ¶¶ 66-67.
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requirement of clarity as to what is and what is not patentable subject
matter.285
Lastly, this lack of harmony between Directive 98/44/EC and Italy’s
patent law forced the EU Commission to contend that Italy had not met
its obligation to fully synthesize the Directive with its domestic law.286
According to the European Commission, Italy did not provide for the
prohibition against the patentability of inventions leading to the cloning
of human beings and the use of human embryos for industrial and
commercial purposes.287 Italy suggested that provisions of Italian law,
outside of its patent law, that dictate human cloning and modification of
the genetic identity of humans as practices contrary to public policy and
morality meet the requirements of Directive 98/44/EC.288 Moreover, Italy
contended that it’s prohibition against activities involving the disposition
of the human body is sufficient notice that the modification of the genetic
identity of a human being could not be patentable pursuant to Italian
law.289 After listing the various specific prohibitions to patentability
pursuant to Directive 98/44/EC and reminding the reader that memberstates are given wide discretion in determining which inventions would
be contrary to public order and morality, the ECJ still commanded that
specific prohibitions are not subject to the level of wide discretion as those
inventions that might generally violate public order or morality. 290
According to the ECJ, the specific prohibitions found in Directive
98/44/EC are to be excluded “unequivocally” from patentability and that
a member-state’s law must provide clarity on these specific
prohibitions.291
B. Taxation.
EU member-states maintain much discretion over the marketplace for
stem cells. In CopyGene v. Skatteministeriet, the ECJ held that national
courts of the member-states can determine whether the activities of stem
cell banks are exempt from the value-added tax (“VAT”).292 At issue in
CopyGene was whether the Danish government could make the activities
of a private sector stem cell bank, which engaged in various activities
including the collection, transportation, analysis, and storage of blood

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at ¶ 73.
Id. at ¶ 75.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 76.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 78.
Id. at ¶¶ 78, 81, 83.
Case C-262/08, CopyGene A/S v. Skatteministeriet, 2010 E.C.R. I-5053, at ¶ 81.
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from umbilical cords for the purpose of securing stem cells from the
umbilical cords for future medical treatment, subject to the EU-wide
VAT.293 The Danish courts referred the case to the ECJ after a firm,
CopyGene A/S, challenged the Danish government’s refusal to exempt its
activities from the VAT on the basis that the potential for the medicinal
use of stem cells and stem cell research is so distant into the future that
the activities of firms like CopyGene could not qualify as current medical
treatment, which by definition would exclude such activities from the
VAT.294
The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC (“the Sixth Directive”)
establishes the VAT framework in the EU and exempts activities within
hospitals, medical care, and related activities.295 The Sixth Directive also
states that the provider of these services must be conducted by an entity
governed by public law, an entity acting under similar social conditions
to that of an entity governed by public law, hospitals, medical centers, or
other duly recognized establishments.296 Directive 2004/23/EC
establishes safety standards for donation, procurement, testing,
processing, preservation, storage, and distribution of human tissue and
cells.297 Directive 2004/23/EC also states that member-states have the
responsibility of accrediting, designating, authorizing, and licensing the
providers of stem cell-related services.298 Danish law met Directive
2004/23/EC’s mandates.299 However, when CopyGene applied for VAT
exemption, the Danish government rejected the application.300 CopyGene
appealed to the Danish courts, arguing that its activities qualified as
“closely related” to the services of a hospital and/or would meet the
definition of “medical care.”301 Complicating this case, the Danish
government previously approved CopyGene to engage in stem cellrelated activities.302 CopyGene specifically would enter into a contract
with clients (parents expecting children) for the collection, transportation,
analysis, and storage of cord blood of the clients’ newborn children for
the only purpose of medical treatment if the child suffered from a serious
illness.303 CopyGene would not own the stem cells, they would be owned
by the newborn child by representation of the newborn’s mother, nor have
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Id. at ¶¶ 2, 3.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.
Id. at ¶ 19.
Id. at ¶ 16.
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the authority to engage in research endeavors.304 However, these services
were not covered nor reimbursed by the Danish government’s public
health care system.305
The ECJ’s decision largely rested on the language of the Sixth
Directive. The ECJ found the VAT’s scope to be broad, encompassing
virtually all traded goods and services.306 Any exemptions found in the
Sixth Directive are designed to ensure that member-states treat all
commercial transactions alike.307 Accordingly, the ECJ held that the Sixth
Directive covers virtually all medical services that can lead to diagnosis
and cure of health problems.308 For example, the ECJ noted that the
definition of medical care within the Sixth Directive has been interpreted
to include medical care that is prophylactic in nature and care that is
designed to reduce the cost of medical care, restore health, and/or protect
health.309
The ECJ held that the stem cell-related services provided by CopyGene
were within the scope of the terms “closely related” to “hospital and
medical” care within the meaning of the Sixth Directive.310 The ECJ
contended that, because of the nature of stem cells and stem cell research,
including the collection, storage, transportation, and analysis activities,
even if the medical care has not yet been performed, commenced, and/or
envisaged, the Sixth Directive allows for a VAT exemption.311 The ECJ
further stated that “medical care” was not limited to current scientific
knowledge.312 As such, VAT exemptions should rest on current medical
practices as opposed to courts’ predictions for the future of medical
care.313
The ECJ next had to resolve the issue of whether the activities specific
to the firm itself, CopyGene, were within the definition of an entity that
could be described as acting similar in nature to hospitals and medical
centers.314 In a somewhat confusing manner, the ECJ held that the
language of the Sixth Directive, as it applied to an entity like CopyGene,
does not require a member-state to exempt it from VAT nor does it require
a member-state to not exempt it from VAT regardless of whether,
304. Id. at ¶ 18.
305. Id. at ¶ 16.
306. Id. at ¶¶ 23-24
307. Id.
308. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.
309. Id. at ¶ 30.
310. Id. at ¶ 52.
311. Id.
312. Id. at ¶¶ 43-45.
313. Id. Although almost ancillary to the decision, but significant to the science, the ECJ made clear
that the only way in which to harvest stem cells was at birth and at such a time in a person’s life, the future
benefits are unknown. Id. at ¶ 45.
314. Id. at ¶ 53.
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objectively, the activities are covered by the VAT exemption and that
neither an entity like CopyGene nor its clients receive support from the
public health care system.315 While agreeing with the Danish government,
the ECJ stated that the mere authorization by a member-state to allow a
private entity to engage in the various stem cell-related activities does not
mean the entity is operating in similar fashion to a hospital or medical
care facility for the purposes of the Sixth Directive’s exemption.316
Although the ECJ returned the decision of whether a firm, such as
CopyGene, and its activities should meet the requirements of the VAT
exemption to the member-state, the ECJ did state that there are factors,
although not decisive, that a member-state should consider such as: (1)
whether the entity receives support from the public health service and (2)
whether the entity is governed by public or private law.317
In similar fashion, the ECJ in Future Health v. United Kingdom found
several stem cell-related activities to be outside the exemption for
VAT.318 Future Health followed the CopyGene case and the ECJ relied
on the latter case to find that the mere storage of stem cells for possible,
future therapeutic use was not within the confines of “hospital and
medical care” for the purposes of the VAT exemption.319 A key difference
between the two decisions is that Directive 2006/112 repealed and
replaced the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, thus revamping the
VAT system across the EU in order to make the law on VAT clearer and
more rational but without a substantial change of the scope of the VAT.320
However, the ECJ stated that the terms of Directive 2006/112 and the
Sixth Directive were identical and that the two laws should be interpreted
in the same manner.321
Specific to the facts in Future Health, the ECJ was asked to determine
whether five activities were within the scope of the VAT tax exemption
for “hospital and medical care” including: (1) providing parents of an
unborn child with a kit used to collect blood from an umbilical cord at the
time of the newborn’s birth, which would be used by a trained
professional at the time of birth; (2) the testing of the harvested blood so
that stem cells could be extracted without contamination; (3) the
processing of the blood in order to extract stem cells for later therapeutic
use; (4) the storage and preservation of the blood and stem cells; and (5)

315. Id. at ¶¶ 77-79.
316. Id. at ¶ 75.
317. Id. at ¶¶ 69, 71-72.
318. Case C-86/09, Future Health Tech. Ltd v. The Comm’rs For Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs, 2010 E.C.R. I-5215, at ¶ 52.
319. Id. at ¶ 49.
320. Id. at ¶ 3.
321. Id. at ¶¶ 25-27.
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the release of blood upon the request of the parents of the child.322 The
firm seeking the exemption from VAT, Future Health Technologies Ltd
(“FHT”), was a private stem cell services provider that would provide
parents of a soon-to-be-born child with a kit to be used by a qualified
health professional (who would be compensated by the parents for his or
her services, separately) to collect blood from the umbilical cord at
birth.323 Then, FHT would provide cryptopreservation, storage, testing,
and analysis services that would allow the parents to tap into the blood
and stem cells at the later request of the parents if therapeutic treatment
was needed.324 The ECJ found from the existing court records that the
British government at one time believed that the collection and testing of
the blood and stem cells would be exempt from VAT, but the storage
services were not exempt.325 The British government later changed its
position and contended that none of the services provided by FHT could
fall within the VAT exemption because the services could not be
separated into individual transactions.326
While deciding that none of the services offered by FHT were within
the scope of the VAT exemption, the ECJ stated that the various
exemptions within the VAT—both in Directive 2006/112 and the former
Sixth Directive—were not designed to exempt all activities that would be
considered within the public interest.327 Instead, the exemptions were
more so present to prevent the member-states from diverging on what
transactions should and should not be exempted from the VAT.328 Next,
the ECJ stated that while services within the scope of the hospital and
medical care VAT exemption are for therapeutic aims and the protecting,
maintaining, and restoring of human health, the mere collecting, testing,
and storing of umbilical cord blood and stem cells are not services
directed at the actual diagnosis, treatment, or cure of human health
problems nor for the maintenance, restoration, or protection of human
health.329 In contrast, the ECJ believed that the services provided by FHT
would ensure that the resource for the later, potential therapeutic
treatment, maintenance, restoration, and/or protection of human health
and that what FHT was providing in terms of services had no bearing on
diagnosis, treatment, and/or cure of human disease.330 The ECJ also
declared that it made no difference whether the services offered by FHT
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at ¶ 24.
Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 21.
Id. at ¶ 22.
Id. at ¶ 29.
Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Id. at ¶¶ 44-47.
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were offered individually or collectively in terms of whether they
resembled “hospital and medical care” for the purposes of the VAT
exemption.331
In another case, the ECJ held that for purposes of the VAT exemption,
the removal of joint cartilage cells from a human patient’s cartilage
material and the later multiplication of those cells for reimplantation for
therapeutic purposes falls within the definition of “provision of medical
care” as defined by the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC.332 In Germany v.
VTSI, the results and material involving human tissue cells were treated
as a service yet the locale of the service and whether the transaction
involved was subject to a VAT exemption were in dispute.333 VTSI was
a German-based biotechnology services firm engaged generally in the
fields of research, development, production, and marketing of
technologies to diagnose and treat human tissue diseases with the focus
on diseases affecting human cartilage.334 Specific to this case, VTSI
would engage in the multiplication of chondrocytes for reimplantation
into a patient whereby the doctors and/or clinics referring the work to
VTSI would be located in other EU member-states.335 In a typical
business transaction, VTSI would be sent cartilage taken from a human
patient for a biopsy and VTSI would treat the tissue to make it possible to
remove the chondrocytes.336 After preparing the chondrocyte cells in their
own blood serum, the resulting cells may or may not be introduced into a
collagen membrane leading to the production of a cartilage plaster that
would be sent back to the referring doctor or clinic residing in another
member-state and then reimplanted in the patient.337 VTSI believed that
its services were not subject to the VAT because its referring doctors and
clinics were located in other member-states.338 The German government
disagreed, arguing that cell movement from doctor/clinic/patient to VTSI
in what the German government called a “short-term separation from the
body” and cell multiplications did not constitute “work” pursuant to
German law.339 Interestingly enough, the referring German court held that
VTSI’s customers (doctors and clients) had used the VAT identification
numbers issued to them by the member-state in which those customers

331.
332.
at ¶ 32.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at ¶¶ 46-47.
Case C-159/09, Germany v. Verigen Transplantation Serv. Int‘l (VTSI), 2010 E.C.R. I-11746,
Id. at ¶¶ 10, 18.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.
Id. at ¶¶ 11.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Id at ¶¶ 12, 17.
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resided and thus the transactions were not taxable in Germany. 340
additionally, the referring German court believed that the transfer of the
multiplied cartilage cells by VTSI to the doctor/clinic/patient did not
make those cells a supply of goods since VTSI did not have the authority
to dispose of the cells freely.341
The Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC states that the supply of goods or
services occurs where the supplier has established a business and/or has a
fixed establishment from which the service is supplied or, in cases
whereby those two possibilities do not exist, a place where there exists a
permanent address or a usual residence.342 However, in cases where the
subject matter of the service involves work on tangible, movable property,
the service locale is the place where the services are physically
conducted.343 Also specific to tangible movable property, the services
locale in cases where a customer has been issued a VAT tax identification
number should be the member-state where the same member-state has
issued that VAT tax identification number.344 The ECJ also reminded the
reader that the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC exempts transactions that
provide medical care by medical or paramedical professions from the
VAT.345 German law also dictates that the service locale should be the
member-state that issued the VAT tax identification number and also
provides exemptions from VAT for activities involving doctors, dentists,
lay medical practitioners, physiotherapists, midwives, and/or similar
professional activities.346
The ECJ stated that the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC should be
considered to encompass a wide range of transactions for the purposes of
taxability, but that exemptions from VAT should be interpreted narrowly
since the general principle of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC is to levy
the VAT on all goods and services provided by a taxable person.347 The
ECJ also articulated that the exemptions should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the objectives supporting the exemptions and thus the
strictness of interpretation should not interfere with the intended effects
of the exemptions.348 According to the ECJ, in regard to the exemption
provided by the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC for the provision of medical
care for therapeutic purposes, while citing CopyGene, the therapeutic

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. at ¶ 16.
Id. at ¶ 18.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶¶ 21-23.
Id. at ¶ 23.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

39

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 3

1016

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

purpose itself should not be defined narrowly and that the removal of
cartilage materials to extract cells for multiplication and later
reimplantation in a human patient is clearly therapeutic.349 The ECJ
declared that the activities engaged in by VTSI were within the definition
of “provision of medical care” pursuant to the Sixth Directive
77/388/EEC and such a determination supports the goal of that particular
VAT exemption which is to reduce the cost of medical care.350
Additionally, the ECJ stated that VTSI’s activities should not be found to
be outside the definition of “provision of medical care” given that the cells
were extracted from a human patient and later reimplanted into the same
or another patient.351
C. Access to records.
Although perhaps a minor case in regard to the full scope of law that
governs stem cell use and research in the EU, the ECJ’s decision in
Sweden v. Commission does help paint the four corners of this area of law
in that it addresses the issue of patient and parental rights.352 It also
provides the practitioner with an idea as to how transparent the EU
governmental institutions are in regard to its records and correspondence
with member-states.353 In Sweden, two parents lost their son due to a
therapeutic treatment procedure involving the use of autologous stem
cells which took place in a private clinic in Germany.354 The parents stated
that the private clinic was not able to engage in the treatment due to
inaction by the German government in breach of EU law governing the
use of advanced therapy medicinal products.355 The EU Commission
launched an investigation into the death through use of an EU Pilot
procedure by contacting the German government authorities directly to
gain information pursuant to the parents’ complaint.356 The German
government complied with the EU Commission’s two requests for
information.357 However, after being petitioned by the parents for the
documents comprising the German government’s response to the EU
Commission, the European Commission rejected access to the specific
documents and replied to the parents that they were not able to find fault

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.

Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25.
Id. at ¶ 27.
Id. at ¶ 29.
Case C-562/14, Sweden v. Comm’n, 2017 E.C.R. ECLI:EU:C:2017:356.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id. at ¶ 15.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/3

40

Tudor and Tudor: Stem Cell Patentability in the EU

2019]

STEM CELL PATENTABILITY IN THE EU

1017

on the part of the German government.358
The foundation of the EU’s Pilot procedure is found in Regulation
1049/2001 which provides for access to public records to the greatest
extent possible but also allows certain public and private interests to be
protected through a set of exceptions that are collectively designed to
allow EU governmental institutions to fulfill their internal functions,
especially when personal data is involved.359 Specifically, the EU
governmental bodies can deny records to citizens when the disclosure of
such records could undermine the purpose of inspections, investigations,
and audits, unless there is an overriding public interest in making those
records open to request.360 More narrowly, Regulation 1049/2001 states
that the above-mentioned limitations on the disclosure of records applies
to documents that EU governmental institutions have crafted or have
received.361
While upholding the decision of the EU Commission to refuse to
provide the parents of the deceased with the documents delivered to it by
the German government, the ECJ stated that there does not exist a general
overriding interest.362 Instead, evaluation of an overriding interest must
be found on the specific facts of the case at the time the facts arise.363
Narrow to the facts of the case at bar, the ECJ found that the parents’
general assertion that they needed access to the documents in order to
protect human health without providing specific allegations as to how and
why the documents would have protected human health was not sufficient
to establish an overriding interest.364 In order to establish an overriding
interest promoting the disclosure of the requested documents, there must
be a specific need that is met by such disclosure.365
D. Legal notice.
While the ECJ’s decision in Commission v. Poland clearly touches on
the issue of human biological tissues and cells, it is also illustrative of the
responsibility of a member-state to meet its obligations under EU law.366
Directive 2004/23/EC, implemented through a procedures dictated in
Directive 2006/86/EC, requires that member-states adopt certain
administrative procedures in handling human tissues and cells which
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at ¶¶ 12-15.
Id. at ¶¶ 2-5.
Id. at ¶ 7.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶¶ 56-58.
Id. at ¶¶ 56, 57, 63.
Id. at ¶ 55.
Id.
Case C-29/14, Comm’n v. Poland, 2015 E.C.R. ECLI:EU:C:2015:379.
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cover activities such donation, procurement, storage, testing, processing,
preservation, and distribution.367 A member-state is deemed to have
fulfilled its obligations when it officially publishes the requirement set
forth by an EU directive in its specific law.368 Directive 2006/23/EC
requires that each collection of donated biological material be assigned a
single European code at the time and place of donation and that the main
characteristics and properties of those tissues and cells be identified at the
same time.369 Associated with Directives 2004/23/EC and 2006/86/EC is
Directive 2006/17/EC, which requires member-state governments to
ensure that the donors of reproductive cells undergo biological tests and
also states requirements for those tests.370
The Polish law in question did identify procedures for the removal,
storage, and transplantation of several forms of biological material
including cells, tissues, and organs; but, its law stated that these
procedures did not apply to the removal and transplant activities involving
reproductive cells, gonads, fetal tissues, embryonic tissues, reproductive
organs, or any associated elements thereof.371 Because the Polish law
excluded from its procedures requirements—identified in EU Directives
2004/23/EC, 2006/17/EC, and 2006/86/EC—on the handling of
reproductive cells, fetal tissue, and embryonic tissue, the EU Commission
charged the member-state with failing to meeting its obligations under EU
law.372 The Polish government disputed the alleged failure to meet its
obligations under EU law, stating that although it had not exactly word
for word transposed the requirements of the various Directives into Polish
law, it could cite several other sources of domestic law in the form of acts,
including laws governing the medical and dental professions, health care
law generally, laboratory medicine, patient rights, and personal data
collection, that maintained the same requirements as the Directives with
the same intended force of law.373
The EU Commission countered the Polish government’s argument by
contending, first, that the member-state could not explain as to why the
procedural requirements required by the EU Directives applied to some
forms of human biological matter but not for reproductive cells, gonads,
fetal tissue, and embryonic tissue.374 Second, the EU Commission
believed that the Polish government’s attempt at adopting the
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368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8.
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requirements of the EU Directives was not clear and precise and therefore
constituted measures that would not be mandatory as required by the
Directives.375 More narrowly, the EU Commission’s concern was that the
domestic law cited by Poland consisted largely of administrative rules
governing medical practice that could be freely amended, are not always
properly disseminated, and, thus, lack binding authority.376
The ECJ held that, by excluding reproductive cells, fetal tissue, and
embryonic tissue, Poland failed to meet its obligations by transposing the
EU Directives into its domestic law.377 According to the ECJ, Poland’s
attempt at codifying the requirements of the EU Directives, as Poland
contends that it did in its domestic law, was insufficient because the
sources of law cited by Poland varied in their legal nature and included
non-binding acts and general applications of Polish civil and criminal
law.378 The ECJ was clear in stating that a member-state does not meet its
obligations pursuant to the requirements of EU law by identifying various
sources of law of questionable applicability, while also identifying
specific exclusions in coverage.379 The ECJ also stated that any
transposition of EU law into domestic law must be clear and precise so
that individuals understand their rights and obligations so that these rights
and obligations can be invoked in front of national courts.380 Perhaps most
damaging to Poland’s argument that its collection of domestic law
provided the necessary procedural requirements associated with the
handling and processing of human biological material was the fact that
the domestic law did not mention the EU Directives as the EU Directives
required when the domestic law was published.381
E. Funding for stem cell research.
Any reader of One of Us v. Commission will learn extensively about
the EU’s democratic, legislative, and judicial processes, and how under
three provisions of the TFEU, Articles 225 (ex 192, 138b), 227 (ex 194,
138d), and 241 (ex 208, 152), along with Regulation 211/2011, provide
individuals and interest groups with unique access to the EU
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government.382 In One of Us, an interest group calling itself “One of Us”
proposed a set of changes to EU legislation through the European
Citizens’ Initiative (“ECI”) with the general purpose of “the juridical
protection of the dignity, the right to life and of the integrity of every
human being from conception in the areas of EU competence in which
such protection is of particular importance.”383 More narrowly, the ECI
defined the human embryo as the beginning of development of the human
body, ensured consistency within EU law whereby the life of the human
embryo is at stake, and created a general ban on, and an end to, EU
financial support for activities leading to the destruction of human
embryos.384 Narrower still, One of Us called for specific language that
excluded EU funding for research activities that destroyed human
embryos for the purposes of obtaining human stem cells and research that
involves steps leading to the garnering of human embryonic stem cells.385
More broadly, however, the ECI also proposed language that would
prohibit the EU from funding abortion activities directly or from funding
other organizations that either encourage or promote abortion.386 The
position taken by One of Us was clearly provoked by the ECJ’s decision
in Brustle.387
After entertaining the ECI, the EU Commission refused to take action
on the recommendations included within it on several grounds. First, all
EU legislation on the subject matter at issue must comply with both the
TFEU and the European Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding
human dignity, right to life, and the right to the integrity of the person
which, according to the EU Commission, includes activities involving
stem cell research.388 Second, the EU Commission stated that the thrust
of the ECJ’s decision in Brustle was not to address the research activities
382. Case T-561/14, One of Us v. EU Comm’n, 2018 E.C.R. ECLI:EU:T:2018:210; Article 225 (ex
192, 138b) of the TFEU states: “The European Parliament may, acting by a majority of its component
Members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate proposal on matters on which it considers
that a Union act is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. If the Commission does not
submit a proposal, it shall inform the European Parliament of the reasons.” TFEU at art. 225. Article 227
of the TFEU states: “Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its
registered office in a Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association with
other citizens or persons, a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which comes within the
Union's fields of activity and which affects him, her or it directly.” TFEU at art. 227. Article 241 of the
TFEU states: “The Council, acting by a simple majority, may request the Commission to undertake any
studies the Council considers desirable for the attainment of the common objectives, and to submit to it
any appropriate proposals. If the Commission does not submit a proposal, it shall inform the Council of
the reasons.” TFEU at art. 241.
383. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2. The ECI for the purposes of later reference is ECI (2012) 000005. Id. at ¶ 1.
384. Id. at ¶ 3.
385. Id. at ¶ 7.
386. Id. at ¶ 8.
387. Id. at ¶ 3.
388. Id. at ¶ 16.
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of individuals and firms within the EU in regard to stem cells, but to only
address the issue of patentability of such related inventions. 389 Third, the
EU Commission commented on the EU’s Horizon 2020 research and
innovation program and defended the program as one that operated within
a strict ethical framework consisting of a “triple lock” system providing
three safeguards that included: (1) the respect for national legislation in
this area of research; (2) that all research projects were subject to peer
review pursuant to a rigorous ethical review; and (3) that EU funds could
not be used for derivation of new stem cell lines or for research that
destroyed embryos or for the procurement of stem cells.390 The EU
Commission argued that the triple lock system removed many of the
concerns put forth in the ECI by One of Us, as both the EU Parliament
and the EU Council had considered ethical issues when crafting Horizon
2020.391 Fourth, the EU Commission contended that all of its funded
activities which require coordination among the member-states meet the
standards sent by the Millennium Development Goals and the
International Conference on Population and Development Program of
Action, the latter of which has identified unsafe abortion practices as an
area of major concern for public health.392 Fifth, and more generally on
the subject of EU budget, the EU Commission argued that all
expenditures made by the EU in the areas of research and developmental
cooperation respect the priorities of human dignity, the right to life, and
the right to the integrity of the person.393 Lastly, and most politically, the
EU Commission noted that the real mission behind the ECI articulated by
One of Us was to reduce the number of abortions in developing countries
where the EU provides assistance; and that the existing EU programs
indeed accomplish this mission by way of activities designed to provide
access to various health services including family planning,
contraception, newborn and child health services, and sex education.394
Although the procedural matters associated with One of Us are beyond
the scope of this work, it should be noted that the EU Commission, EU
Parliament, EU Council, and the International Planned Parenthood
Federation first argued that the interest group and namesake of the case
did not have the authority to submit the ECI nor have it addressed by the
ECJ pursuant to Regulation 211/2011.395 The ECJ, however, believed that
it should entertain the petition brought by One of Us pursuant to
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
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Regulation 211/2011.396 Thus, the ECJ has authority to determine whether
the content of the ECI as submitted to the EU Commission should be
forwarded on to the EU Parliament and EU Council for its consideration
when drafting new legislation on the subject matter.397
Specific to the subject of ethical considerations in the area of research
on human embryos and stem cells, One of Us contended that the triple
lock system was an inadequate system to safeguard the interests of human
dignity because the mere observance of a member-state’s national law
does not set ethical standards and, therefore, the protections for human
dignity rest with the lone philosophy of the member-state.398 Additionally,
One of Us articulated that a peer review system only ensures that research
is conducted pursuant to current scientific standards.399 One of Us also
believed that the prohibition of the use of EU funds for derivation of new
stem cell lines, for research involving the destruction of human embryos
and/or research for the procurement of stem cells, does not go far enough
to protect human dignity since a ban does not exist for the financing of
projects that presuppose the destruction of human embryos.400 Lastly,
One of Us remarked that adherence to the standards set by the Millennium
Development Goals and the International Conference on Population and
Development Program of Action were mere policy objectives and do not
bind member-states in the traditional manner of law.401 Thus, One of Us
was concerned that member-states can freely allow abortions as a
recourse and that the EU’s funding priorities do not demonstrate how the
financial support for access to abortion reduces maternal mortality. 402
Despite these policy concerns, the ECJ made clear that the EU
Commission should be granted considerable lee-way when drawing
legislation because the EU Commission must (1) promote the general
interest of the EU and (2) reconcile divergent interests across the EU
member-states.403 Likewise, the ECJ agreed with the EU Commission’s
point of view that the Brustle decision, although it did identify a human
embryo as the point at which a human ovum is fertilized, only addressed
scientific research on human embryos and stem cells to the point by which
the outcome might be patented, and did not address how such research
should be conducted and funded.404 The ECJ viewed the ECI’s approach
to human dignity as equating a human embryo as a human being and then
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
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assessing the right to human dignity and the right to life to that human
embryo.405 The ECJ found the EU Commission’s ethical approach to,
although take into account the rights to life and human dignity for human
embryos, take into consideration the potential for the discovery of
treatments for diseases that are currently incurable and/or life threatening,
such as Parkinson’s, stroke, diabetes, heart disease, and blindness.406 In
an attempt to harmonize the two positions, the ECJ found that the EU
Commission’s ethical approach was not one of error, but merely one of
difference in contrast to the approach preferred by One of Us. 407 The ECJ
also, while citing a World Health Organization publication, stated that the
practice of unsafe abortions was indeed a threat to maternal health and a
source of mortality; thus, the funding of certain related services does
reduce the likelihood of death for pregnant women.408
F. Common customs tariff.
In a case that sheds light on the vast issues an inventor, firm, or
practitioner may face in the EU regarding stem cell research, the ECJ took
a deep dive into the chemistry of a product containing stem cells to
determine its appropriate nomenclature for the purposes of Regulation
2658/87, which constitutes the Common Customs Tariff for the EU.409 In
Abbott GmbH v. Germany, the parties disagreed on the proper
classification of a product that was essentially a medical testing kit used
to determine the presence of certain substances in human serum and
plasma.410 The test kits were designed for retail sale and contained various
laboratory reagents, where the essential character of the product was a
monoclonal diagnostic reagent that takes a B-lymphoctye-type stem cell
from spleen plasma in a donor animal.411 The lymphocyte, which is
responsible for producing the desired monoclonal antibody, is then fused
with a cancer cell and the new cell produced following the fusion, called
a hybridoma, is later cultivated in a suitable medium for multiplication.412
According to the ECJ, the B-lymphocytes are blood fractions, as are the
monoclonal antibodies hidden in the blood by the B-lymphocytes, and
thus should be categorized pursuant to the Common Customs Tariff as
“antisera and other blood fractions” and anything possessing a
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monoclonal diagnostic reagent should be labeled as such.413
G. Free movement of goods.
In a case that could impact both stem cell-containing and non-stem cellcontaining elements of blood donations, the ECJ held that Articles 34 (ex
28, 30) and 36 (ex 30, 36) of the TFEU do not allow a member-states to
prohibit the inter-member-state shipments of blood products when the
donors of those blood products have been compensated for their
donations.414 Generally, Article 34 of the TFEU prohibits restrictions on
imports moving from one member-state to the next while Article 36
provides exceptions to the free movement of goods when justified in order
to protect the health and life of humans.415 The free movement of goods
is one of the fundamental freedoms of the TFEU and, according to the
ECJ, the exception permitted in Article 36 can only be justified in the face
of Article 34 if the restriction imposed by a member-state is appropriate
to the attainment of the member-state’s goal and does not go beyond what
is necessary to attain that goal.416
In Humanplasma, the ECJ was called on by the Austrian courts to
determine whether Article 34 should prevent the application of Austrian
law, which prohibited the importation of erythrocyte concentrates from
Germany when the blood materials were donated by donors which had
received some form of compensation.417 The Austrian law in question
governing “medicinal imports” stated that such materials could only be
imported if the governmental body with the appropriate authority deemed
the materials as safe for the market.418 The Austrian law also had strict
requirements regarding: (1) the donor’s identity, (2) proof that the donor
had been chosen, (3) donation compliance with relevant international
laws on the subject, and (4) proof the donor was not suffering from
identified viral infections.419 The Austrian law was later amended to
strictly prohibit blood materials from being placed on the market in
413. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13, 16.
414. Case C-421/09, Humanplasma GmbH v. Republik Osterreich, 2010, E.C.R. I-12871, at ¶ 46.
415. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. Article 30 (ex 28, 30) of the TFEU reads: “Quantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.” TFEU art. 30;
Article 36 (ex 30, 36) of the TFEU reads: “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality,
public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions, however, constitute a means of
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.” TFEU art. 36.
416. Id. at ¶ 34.
417. Id. at ¶ 23.
418. Id. at ¶ 8.
419. Id. at ¶ 9.
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Austria if the donor had been compensated in any way, except for cases
where the blood harvesting establishment was in immediate need for a
donation based on an emergency (in such case, only expenses of the donor
would be reimbursed).420 However, the definition of an emergency under
Austrian law did not include the need for blood materials for rare blood
types.421 Additionally, Austrian law required that all importers of blood
materials covered by the law certify that blood materials were donated
without any form of compensation whatsoever unless the emergency
clause applied.422
Directive 2002/98/EC, another form of statutory law, covers the quality
and safety of human blood and blood components when they are
collected, tested, processed, stored, and distributed.423 Specifically,
Directive 2002/98/EC, while incorporating reference to Article 168 (ex
152, 129) of the TFEU, provides that member-states of the EU are
allowed to impose stricter guidelines for quality and safety standards for
blood and blood components than what is provided for in the Directive
itself.424 Directive 2002/98/EC states that the idea of voluntary and unpaid
donations of blood materials are a factor which contribute to the safety of
such materials, thus contributing to human health. Additionally, Directive
2002/98/EC provides that a lack of compensation for blood donations
should be promoted and donors should receive greater public
recognition.425 The Directive also allows member-states to impose the
method by which voluntary and unpaid donations are regulated, including
a prohibition and/or restriction of imported blood materials if those
methods imposed by the member-state are not met by the importer.426
Lastly, Directive 2002/98/EC identifies the required testing protocols for
blood and blood materials.427 Directive 2002/98/EC also references
Article 2 of Recommendation No R (95) 14 of the Council of Europe,
which covers the protection of donors and their health in regard to
harvesting blood materials and also endorses: (1) the lack of payment to
donors and (2) that such donations should be voluntary, and not
compensated by cash or anything that might be a substitute for cash,
including time off for work, unless the time off for work would include
merely the time it takes to donate and travel to the donation site. 428 The

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 11.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶¶ 3, 7.
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Council of Europe Recommendation does state that refreshments and
reimbursement for direct travel costs are compatible with voluntary and
unpaid donations.429
The ECJ found the Austrian law incompatible with Articles 34 and 36
because, although Directive 2002/98/EC does give member-states the
leeway to impose stricter standards for the safeguard of human health in
regard to blood and blood donations, the Austrian law goes beyond what
is necessary to meet the goal of protecting human life.430 This is because
the Directive identifies the testing protocol for such substances which
ensures the safety of humans, which is more protective than a requirement
that a blood materials importer guarantee that all donors were voluntary
and were also not compensated for their donations.431 The ECJ mentioned
that Directive 2002/98/EC and Council of Europe Recommendation No
R (95) 14 do not require donors to act voluntarily and donate without
compensation; rather, these two forms of statutory law strongly encourage
such practices.432 In fact, the Council of Europe Recommendation
acknowledged that donors could receive small tokens, refreshments, time
off from work for direct travel and donation time, and reimbursement for
travel costs.433
VI. DECISIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE.
The Board of Appeals of the European Patent Office’s (“BOAEPO”)
decision in Howard Florey provided several important declarative
statements on not only the patentability of a particular subject matter, but
also on the relationship between the EPC and Directive 98/44/EC.434
Before settling on whether the elucidation of the genetic sequence of the
H2-relaxin gene was patentable under the EPC, the BOAEPO stated that
Article 53 of the EPC was applicable to cases filed with the BOAEPO
before Directive 98/44/EC was enacted as well as afterward, and that
Rules 23(b) and 23(e) were only designed to give Article 53 a more
detailed interpretation.435 Additionally, the BOAEPO stated that it would
interpret Directive 98/44/EC in the same way that it interprets Article 53
of the EPC.436
In Howard Florey, two oppositions were filed against the EPO’s initial
429. Id. at ¶ 7.
430. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 45.
431. Id. at ¶¶ 39, 42-43.
432. Id. at ¶ 44.
433. Id. at ¶ 44.
434. Case T-0272/95, Howard Florey Institute v. Aglietta, (1999) E.C.R.
ECLI:EP:BA:1999:T027295.19990415.
435. Id. at 4, 9.
436. Id. at 9.
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decision to grant a patent with the title “Molecular cloning and
characterization of a further gene sequence coding for human relaxin.”437
According to the opinion, the oppositions were filed by a “green faction”
of the European Parliament based on three grounds including: lack of
novelty under Article 54 of the EPC, lack of inventive step under Article
56 of the EPC, lack of invention under Article 52, and subject matter in
violation of the prohibition against patentability for inventions that violate
the public order and morality clause within Article 53.438 Interestingly
enough, the Opposition Division of the EPO found that an invention
associated with a human gene would not present a bar to patentability
because it would not be considered “outrageous,” to which the Opposition
Division defined as something akin to patenting life since DNA was not
life itself but rather a chemical entity involved in a biological process.439
Thus, since the invention was not outrageous, there existed no offense to
human dignity because the woman who donated the tissue provided
consent and her self-determination was not affected by the exploitation of
the claimed molecules.440
On the issue of patentability in relation to a potential bar based on a
violation of morality or public order, the appellants (i.e., the opposition)
in Howard Florey contended that the subject matter that supported the
grant of a patent was an exception to patentability under Article 53 of the
EPC because the invention was based on a derivation of a person’s body
and thus a violation of a person’s fundamental rights. 441 Furthermore,
according to the appellants, the genetic material that supported the patent
was really just genetic material whereby the inventor merely “cracked the
code” by discovering the number and sequence of human relaxin genes.442
Therefore, a discovery did not really exist since the substance supporting
the patent had been around for thousands of years. Lastly, the appellants
argued that an inventive step did not exist as the isolation of the genetic
material involved well-known techniques and was performed with no
difficulties, and that prior art made the invention nonobvious.443 In
contrast, the respondents (those defending the grant of patent protection)
stated that Rule 23 of the EPC provides four categories of
biotechnological inventions that are not patentable and the subject matter
in question did not fall into any of those categories. 444 The respondents

437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.

Id. at 1. European patent No. 0 112 149.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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also articulated that Rule 23 makes clear the eligibility of patent for
inventions consisting of the isolation of elements of the body and the
technical processes that support that isolation and the H2-relaxin DNA
fell into that description.445 In regard to novelty and inventive step, the
respondents declared that no prior art existed involving H2-relaxin and
there existed no suspicion that H2-relaxin existed.446
The BOAEPO agreed with the respondents that Rule 23 provided a list
of what is barred by the EPC in regard to biotechnological patents. The
BOAEPO also stated that Rule 23 provided a non-exhaustive list of
prohibitions and that Article 53 of the EPC could go further in prohibiting
the patentability of subject matter involving material originating from the
human body.447 However, the BOAEPO found that the process for the
elucidation of the H2-relaxin gene was a patentable subject matter as it
did not fall into the specific prohibitions found in Rule 23 nor did it fall
within the confines of the more general prohibitions potentially associated
with EPC Article 53.448 Additionally, the BOAEPO found the invention
to be novel as it did not find prior art associated with the H2-relaxin gene
nor anything relative to the sequences of the gene or the corresponding
H2-relaxin protein.449 Lastly, the BOAEPO found the invention to
properly involve an inventive step. It found that a skilled person engaged
in the science would not have known that a similar cloning technique used
in the invention at issue would work despite some similar techniques
existing, specifically involving the use of rats and hogs given that the
sequence of human relaxin was not known.450
The Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office’s
(“EBAEPO”) decision in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(“WARF”) is perhaps the best case outlining both the relationship between
the EPO’s judicial tribunals and the ECJ.451 Although the case originated
with the question of whether the inventor’s patent application could
withstand the prohibitions on patentability set forth in Article 53 and Rule
28 of the EPC, the jurisdictional question answered by the EBAEPO
settled that the condition of the relationship between the EPO and the ECJ
in that the former does not have the authority to ask the latter for a
preliminary ruling.452 In WARF, the patent applicant submitted that since
Rule 28(c) (ex 23d) mirrored the language in Article 6(2)(C) of Directive
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 10.
448. Id. at 10-11.
449. Id. at 11.
450. Id. at 12.
451. Case T-0002/06, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (“WARF”), (2008), Enlarged Board
of Appeal of the European Patent Office.
452. Id. at 17.
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98/44/EC, there existed a question of EU law to which the question of
patentability should be resolved by the ECJ.453 The applicant further
contended that the EBAEPO should be treated similarly to a EU memberstate’s national court since the vast number of member-states of the EPC
are also member-states of the ECJ.454 Lastly, the applicant argued that by
not asking the ECJ for a ruling now risked the reality that EU memberstate national courts will interpret Article 6 of Directive 98/44/EC in a
dissimilar manner than required by the EPO.455
The EBAEPO discounted this argument on several grounds. First, the
EBAEPO made note of the fact that the EPC itself nor the implementing
regulations identify any situation whereby the EPO should refer questions
of law to the ECJ and the EPO is a creation of the EPC in which the latter
is the provider of the former’s scope of authority. 456 Second, the EPO’s
judicial organs, although they may be treated as traditional courts, are not
constructs of the EU but instead part of the EPC which is an international
organization that maintains its own set of member-states, not all of which
are part of the EU.457 Third, the fact that EPC was amended to include
language that mirrors Directive 98/44/EC on the patentability of
biotechnological inventions does not allow the EPO to refer cases to the
ECJ as some of the contracting states to the EPC are not part of the EU.458
Additionally, and relatedly, according to the EBAEPO, the EPC only
states that Directive 98/44/EC should be used as a supplementary source
of interpretation for EPC Rules 26 through 29.459 Fourth, the EBAEPO
stated that it made no difference that the EPO’s judicial bodies were
located in Germany, an EU member-state.460 Lastly, the EBAEPO stated
that it was not aware of any precedent allowing for the EPO to refer a case
to the ECJ.461
On the issue of patentability of the subject matter at issue in the patent
application, the EBAEPO in WARF held that the patent application could
not be sustained in the face of Article 53’s prohibition against inventions

453. Id. at 13.
454. Id. at 5. The patent applicant also argued that the EBAEPO was akin to a national court in that
it was located in an EU member-state. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 13-14.
457. Id. at 14.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 15.
460. Id. at 17.
461. Id. at 15-16. The EBAEPO did mention that the patent applicant contended that the ECJ’s
decision in Dior v. Evora, Case C-337/95, (2008) ECR I-2173, which allows the Benelux Court of Justice
to refer cases to the ECJ. According to the EBAEPO, the Benelux Court of Justice is merely the highest
national court of the three countries (Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) whereby it has
jurisdiction. Id. at 16-17.
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that could only be obtained by the destruction of human embryos. 462 After
making clear that Rules 26 through 29 were added to the EPC to
harmonize the EPC with Directive 98/44/EC, the EBAEPO stated that it
would focus its decision on an interpretation of the Directive and look at
the ordinary meaning of the substance of the Directive pursuant to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.463 According to the EBAEPO,
Directive 98/44/EC’s Article 6(2)(c) prohibits the patenting of an
invention if a human embryo is used for industrial or commercial
purposes. This language was the result of EU legislative intent to prevent
the commodification of human embryos whereby one of the essential
functions of the Directive’s language was to protect human dignity. 464 The
EBAEPO disagreed with the patent applicant’s position that since the EU
actually funds some forms of research on human embryos, the EU must
have not wanted to prohibit inventions such as the one at issue.465 In
contrast, the EBAEPO stated that the EU’s selective funding of such
research does not allow for such an interpretation nor does the fact that
the term embryo was not defined by the Directive nor EPC Rule 28, while
the term is defined in the law of some member-states.466
The more technical part of the EBAEPO’s decision in WARF focused
on the actual invention as the patent applicant contended was that in order
for the patent application to be denied, human embryos must actually be
claimed in the application.467 According to the EBAEPO, not only must
the explicit wording of the application have to be examined, but also the
technical teaching of the application, as well as the method by which the
invention is performed.468 On this point, the EBAEPO firmly stated that
since the human embryos had to be destroyed in order to produce the stem
cell cultures claimed in the patent application, the patent could not be
granted.469 The EBAEPO argued that to do otherwise would allow an
inventor who develops a process or product that destroys human embryos
to gain a patent through the artful crafting of a patent application by
avoiding language depicting the entire process.470 Lastly, while
addressing the application of the phrase found in Directive 98/44/EC, “for
industrial and commercial purposes,” the EBAEPO found that the patent
applicant could not argue that the invention did not meet this standard

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. at 29.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
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since the invention itself was for human embryonic stem cell cultures and
not the use of actual human embryos.471 Instead, the EBAEPO held that
when an inventor, such as in the case of this patent application, must go
through a process (the destruction of human embryos) to get the product
(human embryonic stem cell cultures) that fits the definition of “for
industrial and commercial purposes.”472
In a case that was temporarily stalled by the EPO in anticipation of the
outcome of WARF to allow case law on this issue to develop, the
BOAEPO stated that auxiliary statements added to a previous application
could not save the patent application from failing on grounds of lack of
patentability under EPC Article 53 and Rule 28 (ex 23). 473 In California
Institute of Technology (“CalTech”), the namesake patent applicant
sought a patent for an in vitro method of proliferating a clonal population
of stem cells whereby the stem cells were capable of self-renewal but the
culture where the stem cells would rest would not contain fetal calf serum
to produce a population of neural crest-stem cells.474 However, in an
auxiliary request, the patent applicant added the phrase “wherein the cells
are not derived from an embryo” just after the phrase “mammalian neural
crest stem cells” and also added the phrase “capable of being derived from
adult tissue” after the phrase “mammalian neural crest stem cells,”
seemingly in an attempt to save the application’s patentability. 475
Immediately following the EPO’s release of the WARF decision, the EPO
stated that applicant’s application would fail on lack of patentability
grounds based on Article 53 and Rule 28.476 Interestingly enough, the
applicant withdrew its request for oral proceedings and did not object
against the EPO’s initial rejection, following the notification by the EPO
the EPO held the oral proceedings in abstentia.477 According to the
BOAEPO, the central issue in the matter was whether the patent
471. Id.
472. Id. at 24-25.
473. Case T-0522/04, California Institute of Technology (“CalTech”), (2009), Board of Appeal of
the European Patent Office, at 2, 5. The full text of Claim 1 under discussion in the original application
read: “1. A method of proliferating in vitro a clonal population of mammalian neural crest stem cells,
wherein the cells are cultured in vitro in a feeder cell-independent culture medium on a substrate, wherein
the culture medium does not contain fetal calf serum to produce a population of neural crest-stem cells
and differentiated progeny thereof, wherein the neural crest-stem cells are characterized by being capable
of self-renewal in the culture medium and capable of differentiation to progeny cells that are peripheral
nervous system neuronal or glial cells, wherein said neural crest-stem cells express low-affinity nerve
growth receptor (LNGFR) and nestin, but do not express glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP), and
wherein progeny cells that are peripheral nervous system neuronal cells do not express LNGFR or nestin
but do express neurofilament and progeny cells that are peripheral nervous system glial cells express
LNGFR, nestin and GFAP.” Id. at 2.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 2-3.
476. Id. at 3.
477. Id. at 4, 6.
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application possessed subject matter that was in violation of the
prohibition found in Article 53 and Rule 28 on the patenting of material
or processes involving the use of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes.478 After making clear that Article 53 and Rule 28
prohibit both products and methods that lead to the destruction of a human
embryo, the BOAEPO found that the application later after Claim 1
explained that the process stated that “the caudal-most 10 somites are
dissected from early embryos” with the isolation process further
described.479 The BOAEPO found in the end that the two added phrases
were not satisfactory disclaimers that could save the application’s
patentability, given that a complete reading of the application, according
to the BOAEPO, did not completely leave out the possibility of the use of
human embryos.480
In Sangamo BioSciences, the BOAEPO found that although a patent
applicant had used human embryonic stem cells in the research and
process leading up to the invention, the applicant sufficiently disclaimed
that portion of the invention.481 In contrast to Claim 1 of the originally
filed patent application, Claim 1 had been altered in a way that restricted
the claim to a method of altering the state of differentiation in an
embryonic stem cell or population of stem cells, comprising the step of
administering a ZFP characterized by specific DNA-binding domains but
with a disclaimer which specifically excluded human embryonic stem
cells.482 More narrowly, the claim had been changed to seek patent
protection where the invention included only the embryonic stem cells of
mice.483 According to the BOAEPO, even though patents will not be
granted for violations of EPC Article 53, a disclaimer can be used to
disclaim subject matter which would otherwise be found offensive to the
EPC but also allows the remainder of the patent application to result in a
granted patent.484 Once the patentee reduced the claim to allowable
subject matter, hereby only claiming the method of altering the state of
differentiation in a non-human stem cell (stem cells from mice), the
BOAEPO recommended that the patent be granted.485 However, in this
particular case, the BOAEPO made it clear that the exclusion of the
human embryonic stem cells did not introduce a new technical teaching
or disclose any subject matter beyond the application as it was currently
478. Id. at 5.
479. Id. at 7.
480. Id. at 8-9.
481. Case T-1176/09, Sangamo BioSciences, Inc., (2008), Enlarged Board of Appeal of the
European Patent Office, at 5.
482. Id. at 4.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 4-5.
485. Id. at 5, 8.
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filed.486
Although not specific to stem cell research and patentability, the
EBAEPO’s decision in Medi-Physics helps shed light on EPC’s lack of
patentability provisions and the protection of the human body for which
it presupposes.487 The namesake applicant sought a patent for a surgical
procedure that essentially involved the delivery of polarized 129-Xe, in
gaseous, dissolved, or liquid phase, directly to a patient either by
inhalation or injection directly into the heart.488 The process described in
the patent application stated that the process could be conducted before
surgery or during surgery in an attempt to garner additional information
(in real time) about the patient that could allow a surgeon to determine a
course of action after receiving the garnered information.489 Essentially,
the debate at the EPO was whether the process described in the patent
application was an invasive, risk-bearing surgical procedure or merely a
non-invasive diagnostic tool; the former would not be considered
patentable pursuant to EPC Article 53 (ex 52(d)).490 According to the
EBAEPO, the procedure at issue should be excluded under patentability
pursuant to Article 53 even if it comprises or encompasses at least one
feature describing a method that constitutes treatment of a human or an
animal by surgery or therapy.491 The EBAEPO viewed the description of
the procedures in the application as an invasive step involving a
substantial physical intervention of the human body requiring a medical
professional’s expertise.492
Although the substantive position of the EBAEPO is important for any
practitioner seeking patent protection in Europe for a surgical procedure,
what is more important for the purposes of this work is the discussion by
the EBAEPO on the balance between patentability and professional
activity. The EBAEPO, in an obvious fashion, stated that the basic
purpose of the patent system was to provide and incentivize the
development of inventions that can benefit the human condition,
specifically in the field of human medicine.493 The EBAEPO commented
further that the patent system can be used to protect the investments made
by inventors as they seek progress in the medical field and more
specifically, in the area of medical diagnosis.494 However, the EBAEPO
486.
487.
Office.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.

Id. at 5.
Case G-0001/07, Medi-Physics, [2010] Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 65, 74.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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in a sympathetic manner also made clear that although Article 53 excludes
medically-related methods from patentability, the freedom of a
practitioner to use the discovered methods is still available.495 Further, the
EBAEPO provided a comparison to the policy in the U.S. whereby
methods of medical procedure have long been patented, including
methods for diagnosis. It also stated that practitioners that mimic those
patented methods cannot be sued for patent infringement.496
VII. THREATS TO THE HARMONIZATION OF THE LAW GOVERNING STEM
CELL RESEARCH AND PATENTABILITY.
When the European Commission first reported on the ability of
Directive 98/44/EC to harmonize the law on biotechnology throughout
the EU, the report was negative regarding both the action of memberstates to fully implement the Directive and the ability to achieve legal
clarity.497 The case law from both the ECJ and the EPO (the BOAEPO
and EBAEPO inclusive) identified three significant threats to the
harmonization of the law governing stem cell research and patentability.
First, and perhaps the most obvious, is that there are 28 member-states the
EU and 38 contracting members of the EPO, constituting a wide variety
of social and political cultures. These social and political cultures have
been enabled by the two primary sources of law, the EPC and Directive
98/44/EC, and the two primary judicial bodies, the EPO (again, inclusive
of both the its judicial organs) and the ECJ, to allow member-states to
determine for themselves what is considered to be against the public order
and morality. Directive 98/44/EC recognizes the divisions among the
member-states in regard to their domestic laws on this point and also
recognizes the threat such divisions pose to harmonization on this topic.
However, Directive 98/44/EC does not harmonize the law across the EU,
as this source of law makes clear that patent protection is the domain of a
member-state’s national law. Further serving as a threat to harmonization,
Directive 98/44/EC allows member-states to decide best how to conform
to the EPC corpus of law on biotechnological inventions regarding the
specific language a member-state can use to meet the conformity
mandate.
The second threat to harmonization, and certainly related to the first, is
that the case law of the ECJ seems to provide member-states with greater
flexibility instead of a push toward harmonization, despite the ECJ’s
constant recognition of the need for harmonization. The ECJ’s decision
495. Id. at 15-16.
496. Id. at 16.
497. Graeme Laurie, Patenting Stem Cells of Human Origin, (2004) EUR. INTELLECT. PROPERTY
REV. 59.
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in The Netherlands v. Parliament best illustrates this problem. Although
the ECJ went to great lengths to state that Directive 98/44/EC is designed
to keep the internal market harmonized in regard to biotechnology, the
Directive itself does not create an EU-wide patent and member-states can
still create their own rules on public order and morality.498 The ECJ in this
same case stated that Directive 98/44/EC was a legitimate use of the EU’s
legislative authority to protect the internal market so that member-states
would apply the law on biotechnology evenly.499 Therefore, what the ECJ
may have only accomplished is an EU-wide rule endorsing the flexibility
of member-states to determine their own framework for patent protection
that could be malleable to meet each member-state’s political and social
needs but may actually interfere with the internal market.
The problems associated with flexibility were further endorsed by the
ECJ in Brustle whereby the ECJ commented that the public order and
morality prohibition is open to interpretation by member-states and that
national courts have the ability to rely on their own sense of scientific
knowledge to define a human embryo.500 The reader of this work should
be reminded that the ECJ did attempt to define a human embryo, at least
in part, by declaring that non-fertilized ovum received by transplant and
non-fertilized ovum whose division has been stimulated by
parthenogenesis.501 Although the ECJ did state that greater uniformity
was needed by the EU as to what the complete definition of a human
embryo should dictate, the ECJ contradicted itself by stating that there
existed some form of uniform definition and that there should be a greater
effort toward a uniform definition because member-states are free to use
their own discretion when determining the scope of a legal definition of a
human embryo.502 The ECJ did attempt to fill the void left open in Brustle
by providing a broader definition of a human embryo in International
Stem Cell, where it declared that a human embryo should include
whatever could develop into a human being after showing great concern
for the need for a more complete, EU-wide definition.503
Although not directly on the point of patentability, the ECJ was
similarly guilty of providing flexibility to member-states in regard to
whether biotechnology-related services are exempt from the VAT tax in

498. Case C-377/98, Kingdom of The Netherlands, supported by the Italian Republic and the
Kingdom of Norway v. the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, (2001) ECR I7079, at ¶¶ 7, 17-22, 25, 35.
499. Id. at ¶ 7.
500. Case C-34-10, Oliver Brustle v. Greenpeace eV, (2011) ECR I-9821, at ¶¶ 6-7, 37.
501. Id. at ¶ 36.
502. Id. at ¶¶ 26-29, 53.
503. Case C-364/13, International Stem Cell Corporation v. Comptroller General of Patents, (2013)
(United Kingdom),
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CopyGene.504 Regardless of whether the reader of the ECJ’s decision in
CopyGene was the culprit in allowing the flexibility or whether the Sixth
Directive truly requires the flexibility, the discretion afforded to the
national courts and governments of the member-states inhibits the ability
to achieve harmonization in regard to research in biotechnology.
However, the ECJ assisted with harmonization efforts in stating that the
stem cell-related activities in question in CopyGene were subject to an
exemption from VAT. In doing so, the ECH seemingly took away some
member-state discretion by holding that member-states cannot bar
exemption for such services even if the true benefits of such services and
related research may not be determined for years to come.505
In addition to this last part of the holding in CopyGene, the ECJ did
recognize the void between an EU Directive and efforts toward
harmonization in Humanplasma. The ECJ stated that although Directive
2002/98/EC provides for only a lower barrier for what member-states can
require for the safety and quality of blood-related materials and that
member-states can impose stricter guidelines, any set of stricter
guidelines cannot go beyond what is necessary to ensure safety and
quality or will otherwise violate the fundamental freedom of free
movement of goods pursuant to TFEU Articles 30 and 36.506 The
Humanplasma decision is perhaps the best example in the ECJ’s
jurisprudence described in this line of work, whereby the ECJ checked
the discretion held by the member-states in an effort to promote
harmonization. However, and critically important for the practitioner in
this area, the Humanplasma decision only served as a harness on an
importing member-state’s discretion and thus stricter guidelines can be
imposed by a member-state if the blood-related products are not crossing
from one EU member-state to another. Therefore, a member-state is
within its discretion to impose stricter guidelines for the quality and safety
of blood related products if the products remain wholly within that
regulating member-state’s political boundaries.
Although the ECJ could have accomplished more to harmonize the law
governing stem cell and biotechnological research across the memberstates, the EPO did no better. The BOAEPO’s decision in Howard Florey
at least curbed a member-state’s discretion in regard to what would
otherwise be a denial of patentability, by stating that merely because an
invention is “outrageous” does not mean it does not meet the requirements
for patentability.507 However, despite this limitation on a member-state’s
504. Case C-262/08, CopyGene A/S v. Skatteministeriet, (2010) ECR I-5053, at ¶ 81.
505. Id. at ¶¶ 43-45.
506. Case C-421/09, Humanplasma GmbH v. Austria, (2010), ECR I-12869, at ¶¶ 31-32, 46.
507. Case T-0272/95, Howard Florey Institute v. Aglietta, (2002). Boards of Appeal of the
European Patent Office, at 2.
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discretion, the BOAEPO also contended that EPC Rule 23 did not provide
an exhaustive list of what is prohibited from patentability and in regard to
the human body, the EPO can adopt additional prohibitions subject to
EPC Article 53.508 Although it would seem that any additions to the
category of prohibited inventions would apply equally to all EPC
member-states, the lack of clarity on this point, especially in an area of
patentability that is so controversial, will not promote harmonization.
Any practitioner curious or confused about the relationship between
the ECJ and the EPO should read the EBAEPO’s decision in WARF. The
EBAEPO made it clear that the EPO does not have the legal ability to ask
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.509 Problematically, although EPC Article
53 and Rules 26-29 are supposed to mirror EU Directive 98/44/EC, there
exists two independent generators of jurisprudence on the patentability of
stem cell inventions on the European continent. Further complicating
matters, the membership of the EU does not mirror the membership of the
EPO. Therefore, the gulf in the jurisprudence between these two
institutions, notably a difference in the interpretation of these mirroring,
yet jurisdictionally separate sources of law, could result in a gross lack of
harmonization on the topic of stem cell patentability. This schism in
jurisprudence represents the third threat to harmonization. Although this
work is narrowly focused on stem cell patentability and research, one can
imagine other problems associated with a divergence between the EPO
and EU on other areas of scientific research.
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER HARMONIZATION AND
PROMOTION OF STEM CELL AND BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH.
Given what has been presented in this work up to this point, there are
five recommendations that could be made to provide a framework for
greater harmonization in the area of stem cell research, narrowly, and
biotechnological research, generally, in the EU. First, the EPC could be
amended so that the ECJ has jurisdiction over the decisions of the EPO
and its judicial organs in a manner similar to when an EU member-state’s
national court refers a question of EU law to the ECJ. The amendment
would require that the ECJ serve as the final arbiter of patent law in all
EPC member-states and would therefore also become the court of last
resort after either the BOAEPO and the EPAEPO have made a decision.
This would, of course, require the member-states of the EPC, that are not
member-states of the EU, to agree to the ECJ’s jurisdiction in matters of
patent law. Although these non-EU member-states may view this step as

508. Id. at 10-11.
509. Id. at 17.
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a significant limitation on their sovereignty, the trade-off and benefit to
these member-states is that patent law would become more harmonious
to the point whereby firms abroad may be more comfortable investing in
those non-EU member-states and, relatedly, these investors will know
that patent rights are identical across the EU. Already found within the
body of case law from the ECJ that supports this point is a requirement
by the ECJ in Commission v. Italy that patent law be clear and concise
allowing inventors to have knowledge of their rights and obligations.510
Such a reality could spur foreign direct investment across several
neighboring countries by firms that find such countries an attractive
marketplace for their biotechnological goods.
Second, and controversially, both the EPC and the TFEU could be
amended to remove the public order and morality clauses from each
agreement. This clause, found in EPC Article 53 and in Directive
98/44/EC Article 3, could be removed from the text of each document as
this clause seems to create the most leeway for a member-state to engage
in actions that would disrupt harmony in the field of stem cell and
biotechnological patentability. Without question, this clause was placed
in each document, as is the case also with the TRIPS Agreement, to satiate
the concerns of member-states that wish to protect their own cultures
within the scope of patent law as it applies to biotechnology. However,
the removal of this clause would focus patent law as it applies to
biotechnological patents, to issues such as cloning and genetic
sequences— both of which are issues that are much more standardized in
contrast to the much more flexible concepts of public order and morality.
In other words, these more concrete concepts would be much easier to
harmonize across a block of countries in contrast to concepts such as
public order and morality which are not only flexible in the instant, but
could also change based on social and political considerations over time.
Third, even if the public order and morality clauses were not removed
from the corpus of patent law that governs biotechnological inventions
across EU member-states, the ECJ should rethink its decision in Brustle,
where the ECJ stated that despite the need for a uniform definition of a
human embryo, national courts are free to use their own recognition of
scientific knowledge to make such determinations.511 Judicial bodies are
almost never immune from political pressure—regardless of memberstates’ efforts to insulate their judiciaries from politics. If the national
courts of EU member-states are free to use their own sense of scientific
knowledge, then political pressures could certainly sway a national court
to find a body of scientific knowledge to support the end result. Rather,

510. Case C-456/03, Commission v. Italy, (2005) ECR I-5335, at ¶¶ 51, 78, 81, 83.
511. Case C-34/10, Oliver Brustle v. Greenpeace eV, (2011) ECR I-9821, at ¶ 37.
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the ECJ should move to an international sense of scientific knowledge
that would both harmonize law and science across the member-states, but
also further immunize national courts from political pressure.
A fourth recommendation, and also one of judicial reconsideration, is
for the ECJ to reevaluate its decision in CopyGene. The ECJ held in
CopyGene that member-states are free to determine whether specific
research activities fall within the scope of the VAT tax exception.512 Much
like a member-state’s ability to determine its own sense of science to
define a human embryo, the ability of a member-state to freely decide
what is and what is not exempt from VAT equally allows member-states
to judge whether certain activities, in this case biological research
activities, are within the scope of their social and political cultures. A lack
of VAT exemption might create a financial chilling effect on some
biological research activities to the point where such activities are no
longer viable in that member-state, and perhaps worse, pushes those
research endeavors either to another member-state or to another country
that is not a member-state of the EU. Admittedly, if the ECJ removed this
level of home rule for member-states and replaced it with a harmonized
rule as to whether certain biological research activities are within the
scope of a VAT exemption, some of this research activity could leave the
EU. However, if the mission is to increase harmonization, at least
member-states would not work as rivals to either attract, or push out, the
investment that supports biotechnological research. It should also be
mentioned that the European Parliament and European Council could also
do away with this level of discretion for member-states by amending the
VAT tax directive.
The fifth and final recommendation is to shift the ethical debate in the
area of stem cell research and patentability from the issue of patentability
to funding. As stated above, the approach to patentability in the U.S. is
one of agnostic nature whereby assuming the invention, biotechnological
or otherwise, meets the basic criteria for patentability, there is no
judgment associated with public order or morality. Although one could
take the position that the award of a patent represents society’s approval
of the invention, perhaps the ethical debate should shift to whether
member-state governments should provide funding for such
biotechnological inventions either directly or indirectly through a tax
subsidy. If this were the case, member-states would be using the power of
the purse to determine society’s approval instead of the potential award
of patentability. If this framework were adopted by a member-states of
the EU and the EPC, then a denial of public funding would serve as a
determinant of economic development rather than EPC Article 53 and/or

512. Case C-262/08, CopyGene A/S v. Skatteministeriet, (2010) ECR I-5053, at ¶ 81.
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Directive 98/44/EC.
IX. CONCLUSION.
Despite the attempts various institutions, including member-state
governments of the EU and the EPC, and the EU itself, the ethical debate
concerning the use of stem cells, human embryos and the patenting,
funding, and research associated with stem cells and human embryos is
unlikely to fade as any new stem cell-related invention on the European
continent may be challenged on morality grounds.513 Just recently,
scientists have crafted hybrid embryos possessing both human and animal
cells, called chimeras, in an attempt to grow human organs in such
animals with the potential for later transplant into human patients. 514 A
new law in the United States, dubbed “The Right to Try Law,” is designed
to both increase the speed by which patients at grave risk of loss of life
including those that can benefit from stem cell-based pharmaceuticals can
access new therapies and legally protect the makers of those
pharmaceuticals.515 One can also imagine an ethics debate on the liability
of firms crafting such pharmaceuticals and related therapies. A further
ethical dilemma concerns the price at which these newly-found and
successful stem cell therapies, which help researchers and medical
professionals attack the most challenging illnesses, are distributed to
patients.516
Intellectual property rights can assist countries with economic
development, if their intellectual property regimes are trustworthy. 517 The
lack of harmonization in the law governing stem cell research is
problematic if the industry is to continue to grow in Europe. . A high level
of intellectual property protection makes firms more comfortable when
deciding to invest in another country. 518 Reliable intellectual property
protection will allow a country to enjoy greater technology transfer, lower
wage inequality, and greater economic development.519 To be fair, there
is also an argument that developing countries actually experience
513. James Field, The Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cell-Based Inventions in the
European Union, 6 ABERDEEN STUDENT L. REV. 1 (2015).
514. Clive Cookson, Breakthrough Over Growing Human Organs in Animals, FINANCIAL TIMES,
(February 18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/1eff740c-148b-11e8-9e9c-25c814761640.
515. Sumathi Reddy, The “Right to Try” Law Says Yes, the Drug Company Says No, WALL ST. J.
(June 6, 2018, 5:56PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/family-battling-a-rare-disease-sees-roadblocksdespite-right-to-try-law-1528293923?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1.
516. Jonathan D. Rockoff, The Million-Dollar Cancer Treatment: Who Will Pay?, WALL ST. J.
(April 26, 2018, 7:00AM),
517. PATRICK J. W. EGAN, GLOBALIZING INNOVATION: STATE INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 48 (2017).
518. Id. at 168.
519. Id. at 242.
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situations whereby intellectual property rights found inside international
agreements can serve as a constraint on economic growth.520 Assuming
that the overwhelming majority of member-states, that maintain
membership in the EU or the EPO, desire economic development, the case
law presented in this work depicts both challenges and opportunities. The
ECJ in International Stem Cell recognized the balance between the
interests that a member-state may have in growing the economy, to which
maintaining a patentability regime more open to stem cell research may
produce. It also recognized the need for protecting human dignity, which
may reduce the scope of what type of biotechnological inventions are
patent eligible.521 Problematically, the balance between economic
development and the advancement of science in the area of stem cell and
biotechnological research, and the potential harm these scientific
advancements could bring, is not a balance where all member-states
within the EU and EPC recognize a middle ground.
International treaties providing for intellectual property protection are
increasing in number.522 The EU and the EPO have clearly made great
strides over the last four decades in an attempt to create a reliable,
consistent body of law on the subject of biotechnology, generally, and to
stem cell research, specifically. Without question, EPC Article 53 and
Directive 98/44/EC were compromises designed to harmonize the law on
stem cell and biotechnological inventions and to find as much agreement
as possible among many member-states. However, as the case law and
morality issues showcased in this work reflect, the compromise may be
too large a gulf to harmonize the law on stem cell and related
biotechnological research, without the ECJ directing its jurisprudence
toward legal flexibility for the member-states.
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